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The	  case	  seems	  settled:	  both	  in	  the	  field	  of	  	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  in	  the	  discourses	  
that	  accompany	  various	  contemporary	  political	  protests,	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  legacy	  is	  
that	   of	   an	   eruption	   of	   bodies	   in	   at	   least	   two	   respects.	   Firstly,	   as	   an	   object	   of	  
research,	  as	  is	  shown	  by	  the	  countless	  	  studies	  that	  borrow,	  more	  or	  less	  explicitly,	  
from	  the	  programme	  announced	  in	  Discipline	  and	  Punish	  and	  developed	  in	  The	  Will	  
to	  Knowledge,	  a	  programme	  whose	  categories	  are	  criticized	  only	  to	  better	  accept	  its	  
fundamental	  horizon.	  This	  programme	  comprises	  a	  “political	  history	  of	  bodies”	  that	  
carefully	  transfers	  their	  constitution	  from	  nature	  to	  history	  and	  that	  underlines	  how	  
much	  the	  definition	  of	  their	  identity	  and	  reciprocal	  relations	  (whether	  of	  class,	  race	  
or	  genre)	  is	  traversed	  by	  various	  forms	  of	  domination.1	  Secondly,	  such	  an	  enterprise	  
is	  often	  presented	  by	  its	  initiators	  not	  merely	  as	  an	  internal	  inflection	  of	  academic	  
research,	  nor	  as	  the	  quest	  for	  a	  paradigm	  able	  to	  dominate	  a	  particular	  historical	  or	  
philosophical	   issue,	  but	   as	   an	  echo	  of,	   and	  a	   contribution	   to,	   the	  disruptions	   that	  
took	  place	  in	  what	  should	  be	  called	  the	  cultural,	  social	  and	  political	  regime	  of	  bodies	  
within	   this	   closed	   field	   of	   theory.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   1999	   second	   introduction	   to	   her	  
classic	  Gender	   Trouble2,	   Judith	   Butler	   locates	   her	   book	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   two	  
movements,	  both	  leading	  outside	  the	  academic	  realm.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  book,	  
she	  explains,	  born	   from	  an	  autobiographical	  experience,	   is	  marked	  by	  a	   fourteen-­‐
year	   involvement	   in	   the	   gay	   and	   lesbian	   culture	   of	   the	   East	   coast	   of	   the	   United	  
States	  of	  which	  it	  is	  an	  “interior	  product”.3	  As	  for	  its	  reception,	  Butler	  congratulates	  
both	  herself	   for	   finding	   readers	  and	  her	  book	   for	  engendering	  effects	  outside	   the	  
academic	   sphere	   through	  movements	   such	   as	   Queer	   Nation	   or	   Act	   Up.	   Thus	   the	  
                                                
1 The recent study by Elsa Dorlin, La Matrice de la race - généalogie sexuelle et coloniale de la 
nation française (Paris, La Découverte, 2006) would provide French bibliography with an excellent 
example of the posterity of the Foucauldian problematics 
2 Judith Butler, Trouble dans le genre, tr. Fsce E. Fassin, Paris, La Découverte, 2005. 
3 op.cit., p.38. 
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“gender	  trouble”	  of	  the	  title	  should	  not	  merely	  be	  understood	  to	  refer	  either	  to	  an	  
object	  of	   enquiry,	   or	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	   certain	   changes	  within	   the	   traditional	  
conception	   of	   the	   genre,	   of	   which	   Butler,	   simply	   because	   of	   her	   intellectual	  
position,	  would	  be	  the	  instigator.	  If	  theory	  provokes	  trouble,	   it	   is	  first	  because	  the	  
register	   in	  which	   it	  deploys	   itself	  and	  the	  domination	   it	  usually	  claims	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  
social	  world	  are	  themselves	  disrupted	  by	  the	  breakthrough	  of	  an	  instance	  ordinarily	  
kept	  at	  a	  distance—namely,	  the	  body	  of	  its	  author,	  her	  emotions	  and	  their	  fraying:	  
Though	  Gender	  Trouble	  is	  an	  academic	  book,	  it	  began,	  for	  me,	  with	  a	  crossing-­‐over,	  sitting	  
on	  Rehoboth	  beach,	  wondering	  whether	  I	  could	  link	  the	  different	  sides	  of	  my	  life.4	  	  
	  
The	  mention,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  book,	  of	  this	  body	  sitting	  at	  a	  seaside	  resort—
which	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  centres	  of	  North-­‐American	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  culture—is	  not	  
merely	  an	  autobiographical	   interpolation;	   in	   its	  own	  way	   it	  also	  has	  a	  Foucauldian	  
heritage.	  In	  her	  way	  of	  putting	  an	  intellectual	  argument	  and	  an	  immediate	  physical	  
experience	   side	   by	   side—an	   experience	   from	  which	   the	   theory	   arises	   and	   that	   it	  
attempts	  to	  rejoin—Butler	  silently	  mimics	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Foucault,	  in	  1972,	  made	  
the	   mutinous	   bodies	   of	   the	   prisoners	   into	   the	   stimulus	   for	   the	   composition	   of	  
Discipline	  and	  Punish,	  the	  instigators	  of	  the	  upheaval	  this	  work	  aspired	  to	  produce	  
in	   both	   its	   reflection	   on	   prisons	   and	   the	   privileged	   recipients	   of	   this	   new	  
perspective.	   Thus	   he	   was	   able	   to	   write,	   regarding	   the	   mutinies	   that	   occurred	   in	  
French	  prisons	  in	  1971:	  
That	  punishment	  in	  general	  and	  the	  prison	  in	  particular	  belong	  to	  a	  political	  technology	  of	  
the	  body	  is	  a	  lesson	  that	  I	  have	  learnt	  not	  so	  much	  from	  history	  as	  from	  the	  present.	  [...]	  In	  
fact,	  they	  were	  revolts,	  at	  a	  bodily	  	  level,	  against	  the	  very	  body	  of	  the	  prison.	  What	  was	  at	  
issue	  was	  not	  whether	  the	  prison	  environment	  was	  too	  harsh	  or	  too	  aseptic,	  too	  primitive	  
or	  too	  efficient,	  but	  its	  very	  materiality	  as	  an	  instrument	  and	  vector	  of	  power	  […]	  I	  would	  
like	  to	  write	  the	  history	  of	  this	  prison,	  with	  all	  the	  political	  investments	  of	  the	  body	  that	  it	  
gathers	  together	  in	  its	  closed	  architecture.5	  
                                                
4 “Même si Trouble dans le genre est un ouvrage universitaire, tout a commencé pour moi par un 
chassé-croisé, alors que j’étais assise sur la plage de Rehoboth à me demander si je pouvais relier les 
différents aspects de ma vie”., op.cit., p.39. 
5 ET 30. “Que les punitions en général et que la prison relèvent d’une technologie politique du corps, 
c’est peut-être moins l’histoire qui me l’a enseigné que le présent. (...) Il s’agissait bien d’une révolte, 
au niveau des corps, contre le corps même de la prison, ce qui était en jeu, ce n’était pas le cadre trop 
fruste ou trop aseptique, trop rudimentaire ou trop perfectionné de la prison, c’était sa matérialité dans 
la mesure pù elle est instrument et vecteur de pouvoir. (...) C’est de cette prison, avec tous les 
invesitissements politiques du corps qu’elle rassemble dans son architecture fermée, que je voudrais 
faire l’histoire”., Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir, Gallimard, coll. “Bibliothèque des histoires”, 
Paris, 1972, p.35. 
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From	   Discipline	   and	   Punish	   to	   Gender	   Trouble,	   from	   the	   prison	   roof	   in	   Toul	   to	  
Rehoboth	   beach,	   as	   the	   example	   of	   Judith	   Butler	   shows,	   a	   part	   of	   Foucault’s	  
contemporary	  posterity	   resides	   in	   this	   asserted	   coupling,	   in	   this	   link	  between	   the	  
renewal	  of	  the	  theoretical	  comprehension	  of	  bodies	  and	  the	  way	   in	  which,	  on	  the	  
outside,	  they	  assert	  their	  presence,	  their	  requirements	  and	  their	  irreducibility	  to	  the	  
structures	  imposed	  on	  them.	  
	  
The	  coherence	  of	  such	  a	  coupling	  must	  still	  be	  justified.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  the	  circularity	  
of	   this	   “history	   of	   the	   present”6	   is	   misleading	   in	   itself:	   it	   is	   that	   the	   categories	  
supposed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  transformations	  of	  the	  contemporary	  world	  owe	  their	  
own	   renewal	   to	   these	   transformations;	   that	   these	   crises	   provoke	   a	   conceptual	  
shake-­‐up	  by	  dint	  of	  which	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  “think	  of	  them	  differently”,	  is	  what	  
is	   at	   stake	   in	   the	  entire	   Foucauldian	  archeological	   enterprise.	  Rather,	   if	   there	   is	   a	  
difficulty	  to	  be	  had,	  it	  is	  to	  	  be	  found	  in	  the	  differing	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  reference	  
to	   the	   body	   tends	   to	   be	   articulated	   on	   each	   side	   of	   such	   a	   system	   or,	   at	   least,	  
between	   the	   beginning	   and	   the	   end	   of	   the	   enquiry.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   at	   the	  
beginning	  of	   the	  analysis,	  Foucault	  concedes	  that	   fighting	  and	  the	  shadows	  of	   the	  
prisoners	  on	  the	  roof	  are	  an	  immediate	  and	  constitutive	  presence.	  He	  attributes	  to	  
them	  the	  capacity	  to	   force	  their	  way	   into	  theory,	  crediting	  them	  with	  a	  disruptive	  
power	  capable	  of	  opening	  a	  space	   for	  new	   investigations	   in	   the	  thinking	  process	   .	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  route	  of	  which	  the	  aim	  would	  have	  been	  to	  show	  
how	  what	   we	   take	   as	   the	   immediate	   given	   of	   our	   worldly	   being	   actually	   springs	  
from	   a	   conflicting	   genealogy;	   the	   body	   will	   have	   become	   the	   mere	   product	   of	  
circumstance,	   an	   effect	   whose	   precarious	   consistency	   becomes	   dissolved	   into	  
history.	  From	  the	  initial	  impulse	  to	  the	  final	  picture,	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  body	  thus	  
oscillates	  between	  accounting	  for	  an	  instance	  whose	  	  demands	  impose	  themselves	  
imperiously,	   and	   the	  decomposition	  of	   a	  historical	   construction	  endowed	  with	   an	  
artificial	   and	   transitory	   unity.	   If,	   through	   the	   immediacy	   of	   their	   refusal	   (revolts	  
                                                
6ET 31 ibid. 
4 
“against	   cold,	   suffocation	   and	   overcrowding,	   against	   decrepit	   walls...”7),	   the	  
prisoners’	   revolts	   strike	   a	   chord	   with	   Foucault,	   the	   analysis	   which	   follows	   rather	  
tends	   to	   multiply	   mediations	   and	   to	   show	   how	   “the	   individual	   [...]	   is	   a	   reality	  
constructed	   by	   this	   specific	   technology	   of	   power	   which	   is	   called	   discipline”9.	   As	  
Michel	  de	  Certeau	  already	  pointed	  out,	  “we	  find	  in	  Foucault	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  body	  as	  
an	  unreadable	  condition	  of	  the	  fiction	  of	  the	  body	  itself”10.	  
	  
The	  body	  and	  its	  doubles	  
We	  should	  take	  our	  time,	  however,	  before	  proclaiming	  a	  double	  bluff	  because	  the	  
whole	  interest	  of	  the	  approach	  lies,	  it	  seems,	  in	  this	  very	  tension,	  in	  this	  paradoxical	  
complementarity	   outside	   of	   which	   each	   side	   would	   be	   weakened.	   It	   is	   the	   least	  
interesting	   aspect	   of	   Foucault’s	   legacy	   to	   see	   occasionally	   these	   two	   modes	   of	  
reference	  to	  the	  body	  distancing	  each	  other	  in	  order	  to	  create	  two	  series	  of	  equally	  
unproductive	  affirmations.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  monotonous	  evocation	  of	  
the	  resistance	  of	  the	  body	  to	  political	  order,	  of	  its	  stubborn	  and	  silent	  opposition	  to	  
all	   the	   forms	  of	  oppression;	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   there	   is	   the	   litany	  of	  monographs	  
which	   have	   no	   benefit	   other	   than	   that	   of	   establishing	   the	   cultural	   dimension	   of	  
those	   physical	   determinations	   hitherto	   unduly	   attributed	   to	   nature.	   But	   the	  
problem	  is	  therefore	  that	  of	  knowing	  how	  this	  double	  position	  of	  the	  body	  (as	  the	  
foundation	   and	   the	   result	   of	   history,	   as	   condition	   and	   horizon	   of	   the	   theory	   that	  
takes	   hold	   of	   it)	   can	   avoid	   extending	   the	   two	   mistakes	   correctly	   denounced	   by	  
Foucault	  himself:	  	  
1. Of	  avoiding	  entering	  what	  was	  called	  “the	  empirico-­‐transcendental	  doublet”	  
in	  The	  Order	   of	   Things,	   a	   position	   characterised	   in	   that	  work	   as	   both	   the	  
principle	   of	   the	  modern	  episteme	   and	   the	   sign	   of	   its	   closure.	   As	   Foucault	  
showed,	  once	  the	  positive	  contents	  offered	  to	  that	  knowledge	  that	  presents	  
                                                
7 ET 30 “contre le froid, contre l’étouffement et l’entassement, contre les murs vétustes...”, Surveiller 
et Punir, p.34. 
9 “l’individu (...) est une réalité fabriquée par cette technologie spécifique de pouvoir qu’on appelle la 
discipline”, op.cit., pp.195-196. 
10 “on a chez Foucault une théorie du corps comme condition illisible des fictions, et une théorie des 
fictions de corps”, M. de Certeau, “L’histoire une passion nouvelle”, Le Magazine littéraire, avril 
1977, n°123, pp.22-23, in J.-F. Bert, Michel Foucault, regards croisés sur le corps - histoire, 
ethnologie, sociologie, éditions du Politique, 2007. 
5 
man	   as	   a	   living,	   speaking,	   working	   being,	   reveal	   themselves	   as	   the	  
conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  this	  knowledge,	  then	  reflection	  can	  only	  trample	  
indefinitely	   between	   each	   one	   of	   these	   poles.	   As	   it	   does	   so	   it	   becomes	  
proportionately	   less	   certain	   of	   its	   operations	   as	   they	   are	   discovered	   as	  
being	   profoundly	   rooted	   in	   the	   mundane	   co-­‐ordinates	   of	   human	  
experience.	   We	   should	   emphasise	   that	   in	   the	   typology	   proposed	   by	  
Foucault	  to	  describe	  this	  game	  of	  mirrors	  between	  “man	  and	  his	  doubles”,	  
the	  first	  of	  these	  “positive	  forms	  in	  which	  man	  can	  learn	  that	  he	  is	  finite”	  is	  
well	   and	   truly	   the	   body:	   “to	   man’s	   experience	   a	   body	   has	   been	   given,	   a	  
body	  which	   is	   his	  body	  –	   a	   fragment	  of	   ambiguous	   space,	  whose	  peculiar	  
and	   irreducible	   spatiality	   is	   nevertheless	   articulated	   upon	   the	   space	   of	  
things”11.	   And	   yet,	   genealogy	   seems	   rightly	   to	   extend	   this	   intellectual	  
strategy:	  it	  depends	  here	  on	  the	  transformation	  arising	  from	  the	  eruption	  of	  
the	  bodies	  in	  the	  social	  field	  in	  order	  to	  retrace	  the	  steps	  and	  the	  forms	  of	  
their	   historical	   constitution.	   Can	   we	   avoid,	   henceforth,	   reproducing	   the	  
gesture	  which,	  according	  to	  Foucault,	  condemns	  the	  human	  sciences	  to	  the	  
endless	   repetition	   of	   the	   Same,	   by	   transferring	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	  
possibility	  of	  knowledge	  on	  to	  the	  facts	  offered	  to	  it?	  	  
	  
2.	  A	  normative	  difficulty	  is	  added	  to	  this	  epistemological	  problem.	  How	  to	  make	  
the	  immediacy	  of	  bodies,	  their	  protests	  and	  their	  demands,	  the	  guiding	  thread	  
of	  an	  active	  critique	  without	   indirectly	  extending	   the	   fiction	  of	  an	   instance	  so	  
far	   repressed	   and	   kept	   at	   the	   edge	   of	   history?	   And	   how,	   in	   this	   instance,	   to	  
avoid	   reinforcing	   the	   idea,	   considered	  by	  Foucault	  as	   suspicious,	   according	   to	  
which	  emancipation	  would	  rediscover	  what	  has	  been	  kept	  silent	  for	  too	  long?	  It	  
is	   in	   The	   Will	   to	   Knowledge,	   this	   time,	   that	   the	   problem	   becomes	   more	  
apparent,	  as	  the	  book	  takes	  to	  such	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  radicality	  the	  idea,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	   of	   a	   historical-­‐political	   constitution	  of	   the	  body	   and,	   on	   the	  other,	  
                                                
11 ET 314 “formes positives où l’homme peut apprendre qu’il est fini (...) à l’expérience de l’homme, 
un corps est donné qui est son propre corps - fragment d’espace ambigu, dont la spatialité propre et 
irréductible s’articule cependant sur l’espace des choses”, Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses, 
reed. Paris, Gallimard (coll. “Tel”), p.325. 
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the	  affirmation	  that	  the	  calls	  for	  liberation	  contribute	  effectively	  to	  maintaining	  
the	   modern	   system	   of	   power.	   Refusing	   the	   horizon	   of	   a	   “sexual	   liberation”,	  
Foucault	   claims	   that	   on	   the	   contrary,	   	   we	   ought	   to	   	   understand	   how	   the	  
instance	   of	   sex,	   and	   its	   supposed	   concealment,	   are	   actively	   produced	   by	   the	  
organisation	   of	   power-­‐knowledge	   which	   he	   calls	   “the	   system	   of	   sexuality”:	  
what	  properly	  qualified	  the	  profound	  aspirations	  of	  the	  body,	   is	   thus	  exposed	  
to	   the	   effects	   of	   social	   construction.	   In	   the	   same	   movement,	   however,	  
answering	   the	   question	   that	   looks	   for	   an	   appropriate	   opposition	   to	   such	   a	  
system,	  the	  text	  calls	  for	  the	  body:	  
It	  is	  the	  agency	  of	  sex	  that	  we	  must	  break	  away	  from,	  if	  we	  aim	  –	  through	  a	  tactical	  reversal	  of	  
the	  various	  mechanisms	  of	  sexuality	  –	  to	  counter	  the	  grips	  of	  power	  with	  the	  claims	  of	  bodies,	  
pleasures	   and	   their	   knowledges,	   in	   their	   multiplicity	   and	   their	   possibility	   of	   resistances.	   The	  
tallying	  point	   for	   the	   counterattack	  against	   the	  deployment	  of	   sexuality	  ought	  not	   to	  be	   sex-­‐
desire,	  but	  bodies	  and	  pleasures.12	  
	  
Given	  that	  sex	   is	  a	  product	  of	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  sexuality	  and	  furthermore	  given	  
that	  to	  these	  mechanisms	  should	  be	  opposed	  this	  body	  and	   its	  pleasure,	  how	  can	  
one	   avoid	   naturalising	   the	   latter?	   How	   can	   one	   avoid	   playing	   to	   the	   “repressive	  
hypothesis”	  which	  throughout	  this	  first	  volume	  of	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality	  Foucault	  
asks	  us	  to	  distance	  ourselves	  from.	  
	  
In	  order	   to	  respond	  to	  this	  question,	  we	  must	  pay	  attention	  to	  detail.	  “The	  body”	  
that	   Foucault	   invokes	   here	   is	   not	   exactly	   the	   “sex”	   that	   he	   represents,	   in	   the	  
singular,	   as	  a	   construction.	   From	  one	   to	   the	  other	   there	   is	  a	  numerical	  difference	  
that	   is	  understood	  as	  not	  merely	  playing	  a	  quantitative	  but	  also	  an	  operative	   role	  
insofar	   as	   it	   helps	   to	   distinguish	   the	   different	   registers	   of	   the	   analysis.	   Unity,	  
diversity	   and	  multiplicity	   are	   staggered	   in	   this	   passage	   and	   come	   to	   characterise	  
respectively	  the	  phenomenon	  whose	  justification	  is	  at	  stake	  (“the	  agency	  of	  sex”);	  
the	   mechanisms	   which	   combine	   to	   produce	   it	   (“the	   various	   mechanisms	   of	  
                                                
12 ET 157, “C’est de l’instance du sexe qu’il faut s’affranchir si, par un retournement tactique des 
divers mécanismes de la sexualité, on veut faire valoir contre les prises du pouvoirs les corps, les 
plaisirs, les savoirs, dans leur multiplicité et leur possibilité de résistance. Contre le dispositif de 
sexualité, le point d’appui de la contre-attaque ne doit pas être le sexe-désir, mais les corps et les 
plaisirs”., Michel Foucault, La Volonté de Savoir, Paris, Gallimard (coll. “Bibliothèque des 
histoires”), 1976, p.208. 
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sexuality”);	   the	   constitutive	   elements,	   in	   other	   words,	   of	   this	   operation,	   the	  
surfaces	   of	   inscription,	   for	   “the	   factory	   of	   sex”	   	   and	   the	   principles	   of	   its	   possible	  
destabilisation:	   “bodies,	   pleasures,	   and	   knowledges	   in	   their	   multiplicity”,	   “bodies	  
and	  pleasures”.	  We	  do	  not	  face,	  therefore,	  a	  circular	  argument	  of	  which	  the	  same	  
body	  would	  constitute	  at	  the	  same	  time	  both	  the	  starting	  point	  and	  the	  destination,	  
but	  a	   layered	  analysis	  where	  Foucault	  distributes,	   in	   several	  distinct	   registers,	   the	  
acceptations	   ordinarily	   confused	   with	   the	   general	   notion	   of	   the	   body.	   Without	  
doubt,	  any	  philosophy	  rigorously	  beginning	  to	  approach	  this	  object,	   is	  constrained	  
to	  such	  an	  ordering:	  whoever	  claims	  to	  treat	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  body	  is	  soon	  led	  to	  
distinguish	  and	  articulate	  at	  least	  the	  question	  of	  one’s	  own	  body,	  of	  the	  living	  body	  
and	  finally	  of	  the	  material	  body.	  If	  Foucault’s	  approach	  is	  distinct,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  it	  is	  
by	  his	  way	  of	  conducting	  this	  analysis	  in	  reverse	  and	  performing	  	  decisive	  inversions	  
of	   it.	   In	   short,	   contrary	   to	   all	   phenomenology,	   he	   firstly	   gives	   the	   lived	  
consciousness	   of	   one’s	   own	   body	   the	   anonymous	   objectivity	   that	   constitutes	   the	  
body;	   then,	  contrary	   to	  all	   research	   into	  essences,	  he	  derives	   this	  very	  unity	   from	  
the	   multiplicity	   of	   the	   bodies	   and	   their	   socio-­‐political	   interaction.	   Let	   us	   now	  
examine	  these	  different	  aspects.	  
	  
The	  body:	  an	  archeology	  of	  one’s	  own	  body	  
An	  often	  acknowledged	  interpretation	  claims	  that	  Foucault	  only	  made	  reference	  to	  
the	   body	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1970s,	   influenced	   both	   by	   a	   careful	   reading	   of	  
Nietzschean	  genealogy13	  and	  the	  deadlock	  to	  which	  archaeology	  succumbs,	  because	  
it	   is	   too	   exclusively	   discursive,	   and	   therefore	   incapable	   of	   giving	   a	   foundation	   to	  
statements	  and	  of	  explaining	  the	  passage	  from	  one	  episteme	   to	  another14.	  Such	  a	  
reading	   is	   justified:	   we	   will	   come	   back	   to	   this.	   But	   one	   cannot	   forget	   that	   the	  
research	  undertaken	  during	  the	  1960s,	  far	  from	  ignoring	  the	  body,	  already	  placed	  it	  
as	   one	  of	   the	   central	   points	   of	   focus	   through	  The	  Birth	  of	   the	  Clinic,	   published	   in	  
1964.	  The	  point	  of	  this	  work	  is	  firstly	  to	  show	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  relate	  the	  birth	  of	  
                                                
13 The essay “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire” testifies to this. See Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits, 
T.II, Paris, Gallimard (coll. “Biblothèque des sciences humaines”), 1994, Text 84. 
14 This is the reading particularly defended by H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault, un 
parcours philosophique, Gallimard (coll. “Bibliothèque des sciences humaines”), 1984, ch. V. 
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modern	  medicine,	  not	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  disease	  already	  available	   in	  
things,	  but	  to	  the	  re-­‐organisation	  of	  the	  social,	  discursive	  and	  epistemic	  conditions	  
of	  medical	  experience	  itself.	  As	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  book	  states:	  
For	   clinical	   experience	   to	  become	  possible	  as	   a	   form	  of	   knowledge,	   a	   re-­‐organisation	  of	  
the	   hospital	   field,	   a	   new	   definition	   of	   the	   status	   of	   the	   patient	   in	   society,	   and	   the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  certain	  relationship	  between	  public	  assistance	  and	  medical	  experience,	  
between	  help	   and	   knowledge,	   became	  necessary.	   [...]	   It	  was	   also	   necessary	   to	   open	  up	  
language	  to	  a	  whole	  new	  domain:	  that	  of	  a	  perpetual	  and	  objectively	  based	  correlation	  of	  
the	  visible	  and	  the	  expressible.15	  
	  
By	   choosing	   to	   proceed	   in	   this	   way,	   Foucault	   nonetheless	   forces	   himself	   to	   find	  
another	   way	   of	   researching	   the	   “conditions	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   medical	  
experience”.	  This	  other	  strategy,	  starting	  from	  the	  observation	  according	  to	  which	  
the	   strictly	   objective	   comprehension	   of	   the	   body	   is	   powerless	   to	   ground	   itself,	  
would	   consist	   in	   rooting	   it	   in	   the	   originary	   experience	   of	   the	   lived	   body,	   not	  
understood	  as	  a	  sensible	  apprehension	  preceding	  a	  rigorous	  knowledge,	  but	  as	  the	  
condition	  of	  every	  presence	  of	  the	  subject	  to	  the	  world	  and	  to	  itself.	  We	  will	  have	  
recognized,	   in	   this	   alternative	   route,	   the	   approach	   developed	   in	   French	  
phenomenology	   by	  Maurice	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  whose	   Structure	   of	   Behaviour	   (1942)	  
and	   Phenomenology	   of	   Perception	   (1945)	   constitute	   the	   background	   from	   which	  
Foucault’s	  work	  aims	  to	  distinguish	  itself.	  From	  this	  sort	  of	  rivalry	  between	  historical	  
archeology	   and	   phenomenology	   there	   ensues	   a	   peculiar	   mix	   of	   proximity	   and	  
distance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  Merleau-­‐Pontian	  characterisation	  of	   the	  body.	  Thus	  one	  can	  
hear	  Foucault,	  during	  a	  1966	  radio	  conference,	  adopting	  a	  very	  close	  position	  to	  the	  
one	  of	  Merleau-­‐Ponty:	  
[My	  body]	  is	  linked	  to	  “elsewhere”	  in	  the	  world,	  and,	  actually,	  it	  is	  somewhere	  else	  than	  in	  
the	  world.	  For	  it	  is	  around	  it	  that	  things	  are	  disposed	  and	  it	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  it	  as	  in	  relation	  
to	   a	   sovereign,	   that	   there	   is	   an	   above,	   an	   under,	   a	   right	   and	   a	   left,	   a	   forwards	   and	   a	  
backwards,	  a	  near	  and	  a	  far...	  The	  body	  is	  this	  small	  utopian	  core	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  world	  
from	  which	  I	  dream,	  speak,	  go	  forward,	  imagine,	  and	  perceive	  things	  in	  their	  own	  place”.16	  
                                                
15 ET 242 “Pour que l’expérience clinique fût possible comme forme de connaissance, il a fallu toute 
une réorganisation du champ hospitalier, une définition nouvelle du statut du malade dans la société et 
l’instauration d’un certain rapport avec l’assistance et l’expérience, le secours et le savoir (...) il a fallu 
ouvrir le langage à tout un domaine nouveau ; celui d’une corrélation perpétuelle et objectivement 
fondée du visible et de l’énonçable”., Michel Foucault, Naissance de la clinique, réed. Paris, PUF 
(coll. “Quadrige”), 1993, pp.199-200. 
16 “(Mon corps) est lié à tous les ‘ailleurs’ du monde, et à vrai dire, il est ailleurs que dans le monde ; 
car c’est autour de lui que les choses sont disposées, et c’est par rapport à lui, comme par rapport à un 
souverain, qu’il y a un dessus, un dessous, une droite, une gauche, un avant, un arrière, un proche, un 
lointain... Le corps est au coeur du monde, ce petit noyau utopique à partir duquel je rêve, je parle, 
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In	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic,	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  conversely	  taking	  a	  step	  backwards	  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis	   this	   sovereignty	   granted	   to	   the	   lived	   body	   concerning	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	  
world.	  Foucault’s	  argument	  consists	  in	  defending	  the	  following:	  if	  modern	  objective	  
knowledge	   is,	   as	   Merleau-­‐Ponty	   claims,	   dependent	   on	   a	   more	   fundamental	  
corporeity,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  see	  an	  essential	  datum	  here,	  	  returning	  to	  the	  root	  
of	   the	   cogito	   in	   the	   experience	   of	   one’s	   own	   body;	   rather	   it	   is	   a	   fact	   of	   history,	  
linked	   to	  a	  change	   in	   the	  “fundamental	   structures	  of	  knowledge”17,	  a	   structure	  of	  
which	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  the	  centre.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  the	  thesis	  which	  is	  announced	  
with	   clarity	   in	   the	   last	   section	   of	   the	   work:	   Foucault	   makes	   positivism,	   which	  
apprehends	   the	   body	   as	   exteriority,	   and	   phenomenology,	   which	   claims	   on	   the	  
contrary	  to	  install	   it	  at	  the	  very	  centre	  of	  experience,	  opposing	  slopes	  of	  the	  same	  
historical	  configuration:	  
That	  with	  which	  phenomenology	  was	  to	  oppose	   (positivism)	  so	  tenaciously	   	  was	  already	  
present	   in	   its	   underlying	   structures:	   the	   original	   powers	   of	   the	   perceived	   and	   its	  
correlation	   with	   language	   in	   the	   original	   forms	   of	   experience,	   the	   organization	   of	  
objectivity	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   sign	  values,	   the	  secretly	   linguistic	   structure	  of	   the	  datum,	  the	  
constitutive	  character	  of	  corporal	  spatiality,	   the	   importance	  of	   finitude	   in	   the	  relation	  of	  
man	  with	  truth,	  and	  in	  the	  foundation	  of	  this	  relation,	  all	  this	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  genesis	  
of	  positivism	  […]	  so	  much	  so	  that	  contemporary	  thought,	  believing	  that	   it	  has	  escaped	  it	  
since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   has	   merely	   rediscovered,	   little	   by	   little,	   that	  
which	  made	  it	  possible.18	  
	  
As	  far	  as	  we	  are	  concerned,	  this	  passage	  can	  be	  read	  thus:	  if	  phenomenology	  is	  right	  
to	   bring	   back	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   body	   –	   the	   knowledge	   in	   particular	   that	  
medicine	   develops	   –	   to	   a	   system	   of	   conditions	   that	   is	   not	   revealed	   by	   the	   sole	  
authority	  of	  facts,	  and	  which	  would	  impose	  themselves	  and	  derive	  their	  sense	  from	  
themselves	  out	  of	   the	  concern	   for	  objectivity,	   it	   is	   in	   turn	  mistaken	  about	   its	  own	  
                                                                                                                                     
j’avance, j’imagine, je perçois les choses en leur place”., Michel Foucault, “Le corps utopique”, 
radiophonic conference from December 21st 1966, available on France-Culture CD, coll. “INA / 
Mémoire vive”. 
17 ET 246 TM. Naissance de la clinique, p.202. 
18 ET 246 “Ce que la phénoménologie opposera (au positivisme) avec le plus d’obstination était 
présent déjà dans le système de ses conditions : les pouvoirs signifiants du perçu et sa corrélation avec 
le langage dans les formes originaires de l’expérience, l’organisation de l’objectivité à partir des 
valeurs du signe, la structure secrètement linguistique du donné, le caractère constituant de la 
spatialité corporelle, l’importance de la finitude dans le rapport de l’homme à la vérité et dans le 
fondement de ce rapport, tout cela était déjà mis en jeu dans la genèse du positivisme (...) si bien que 
la pensée contemporaine, coryant lui avoir échappé depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, n’a fait que 
redécouvrir peu à peu ce qui l’avait rendu possible”., op.cit., p.203, underlined by us. 
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account	  when	  it	  posits	  its	  conditions	  as	  an	  ahistorical	  experience,	  when	  it	  claims	  to	  
deduce	  them	  from	  the	  manner	  in	  which,	  for	  all	  of	  eternity	  ,	  my	  body	  is	  given	  to	  me	  
(and	  gives	  me	  the	  exterior	  world	  as	  its	  relation,	  turning	  the	  latter	  into	  an	  organised,	  
spatialised	   and	   significant	   system).	   If	   we	   follow	   Foucault,	   we	   must	   however	  
rediscover	  both	  “the	  body”,	  such	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  by	  modern	  medicine,	  and	  “my	  
body”	   from	  which	  phenomenology	   tries	   to	  unfold	  experience,	  as	   two	  sides	  of	   the	  
same	   historical	   transformation,	   	   one	   that	   initiates	   the	   development	   of	   a	   body	  
offered	  to	  the	  gaze	  and	  a	  body	  speaking	  about	   itself,	  and	  we	  must	  derive	  both	  of	  
them	   together	   from	   an	   encounter	   with	   exterior	   determinations	   –	   social	   forms,	  
perceptual	  codes,	  discursive	  structures.	  
	  
This	   diversion	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   argument	   from	   the	   very	   first	   chapter	   of	   the	  
work.	  Entitled	  “Spaces	  and	  Classes”,	   it	   is	   characteristic	  of	   the	   two-­‐way	  movement	  
according	   to	  which	  Foucault	  deals	  with	   the	  question	  of	   the	  body.	  Noting	   that	   “to	  
our	  well-­‐worn	  eyes	  ,	  the	  human	  body	  defines,	  by	  natural	  right,	  the	  space	  of	  origin	  
and	   of	   distribution	   of	   disease”19,	   he	   endeavours	   however	   to	   establish	   that	   “the	  
exact	  superposition	  of	  the	  ‘body’	  of	  the	  disease	  and	  the	  body	  of	  the	  sick	  man	  is	  no	  
more	   than	   a	   historical,	   temporary	   datum	   [...]	   The	   space	   of	   configuration	   of	   the	  
disease	   and	   the	   space	   of	   localisation	   of	   the	   illness	   in	   the	   body	   have	   been	  
superimposed,	  in	  medical	  experience,	  	  for	  only	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time.”20	  
Indeed,	  for	  the	  classifying	  medicine	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  disease	  first	  of	  all	  is	  
defined	   in	   the	   taxonomic	   space	  which	   links	   it	   to	   the	   other	  maladies	   according	   to	  
relations	  of	  genre	  and	   the	   species.	  As	   for	   this	   first	  distribution,	   the	   localisation	  of	  
the	   disease	   in	   the	   body	   of	   the	   patient	   plays	   a	   lateral	   role,	   a	   “secondary	  
spatialisation”	   which	   inflects	   symptoms	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   in	   botany	   the	  
geographical	  distribution	  of	  a	  species,	  the	  soil	  and	  depth	  on	  which	  it	  grows,	  are	  able	  
to	  modify	  some	  of	  its	  characteristics	  without	  changing	  its	  essential	  definition.	  “The	  
                                                
19 ET 2, “pour nos yeux déjà usés, le corps humain constitue, par droit de nature, l’espace d’origine et 
de répartition de la maladie (...) la coïncidence exacte du ‘corps’ de la maladie et du corps de l’homme 
malade n’est sans doute qu’une donnée historique et transitoire (...). L’espace de configuration de la 
maladie et l’espace de localisation du mal dans le corps n’ont été superposés, dans l’expérience 
médicale, que pendant une courte période”, op.cit., p.1. 
20 ibid. 
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same,	   single	   spasmodic	  malady	  may	  move	   from	   the	   lower	   part	   of	   the	   abdomen,	  
where	   it	  may	  cause	  dyspepsia,	  visceral	   congestion,	   interruptions	  of	   the	  menstrual	  
or	   haemorrhoidal	   flow,	   towards	   the	   chest,	   with	   breathlessness,	   palpitations,	   the	  
feeling	  of	  a	   lump	   in	   the	   throat,	  coughing	  and	   finally	   reaching	   the	  head...”.21	  What	  
interests	   Foucault	   is	   visible	   in	   the	   faltering	   regard	   induced	   by	   the	   exhibition	   of	  
medicine	  from	  another	  age.	  His	  approach	  can	  be	  analysed	  as	  follows:	  1)	  At	  the	  start,	  
he	   questions	   the	   positivist	   reduction	   of	   the	   body	   to	   an	   object	   in	   which,	   for	   all	  
eternity,	   the	  disease	  would	  have	  been	   readable	  as	   long	  as	  we	  want	   to	   see	   it:	   the	  
fact	   that	   the	  disease	  unfolds	   itself	   in	   the	   space	  of	   the	  body	   is	   an	  event	  which,	   as	  
phenomenology	  maintains,	  requires	  a	  displacement	  away	  from	  objective	  vision.	  2)	  
However,	  digging	  into	  the	  medical	  archive	  will	  allow	  us	  to	   locate	  this	  “constitutive	  
character	  of	  corporeal	  spatiality”	  where	  the	  phenomenologist	  was	  not	  expecting	  it:	  
not	   in	   the	   intimacy	   of	   the	   experience	   that	   the	   subject	   has	   of	   his	   own	   body	   and	  
through	   his	   own	   body,	   but	   in	   the	   recovery	   of	   two	   spaces,	   at	   first	   mutually	  
exclusive—	  classified	  and	  organic	  space;	  that	  is,	  the	  “flat,	  homogenous,	  homologous	  
space	  of	  classes”	  and	  the	  “geographical	  system	  of	  masseuses	  differentiated	  by	  their	  
volume	  and	  distance”22.	  3)	  	  As	  for	  this	  train	  of	  thought,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  account	  for	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  modern	  subject	  acquires	  a	  body	  that	  is	  “his	  own	  body”	  –	  in	  the	  
present	  case,	  a	  disease	  that	  really	  is	  his	  own,	  for	  it	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  indifferent	  	  to	  
its	  definition	  that	  it	  appears	  at	  such	  a	  point	  of	  the	  organism.	  But	  this	  transformation	  
does	  not	  show,	  as	  phenomenology	  claims,	  the	  regaining	  of	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  self	  that	  
would	  be	  older	   than	  any	  possible	  objectification.	   The	  deep	   intimacy	  between	   the	  
disease	  and	  the	  patient	  follows	  from	  the	  first	  exteriority	  and	  the	  overlap	  between	  
the	   spaces	   where	   knowledge	   was	   distributed	   up	   until	   then.	   One	   could	   say	   that	  
where	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	   brings	   back	   the	   ‘body	   as	   object’	   to	   one’s	   own	   body,	  which	  
gives	   it	   its	   sense	   and	   permits	   its	   understanding,	   Foucault	   argues	   that	   this	   “own”	  
[propre]	   is	   first	  of	   all	   alien	   [impropre],	   as	   it	   results	   from	  historical	   events	   that	  are	  
                                                
21 ET 10, Une seule et même affection spasmodique peut se déplacer du bas-ventre où elle provoquera 
des dyspepsies, des engorgements viscéraux, des interruptions du flux menstruel ou hémorroïdal, vers 
la poitrine avec des étouffements, palpitations, sensation de boule dans la gorge, quintes de toux et 
finalement gagner la tête...”, op.cit., pp.8-9. 
22 ET 9 “espace plat, homogène des classes (...) système géographique de masses différentiées  par 
leur volume et leur distance”, op.cit., p.8. 
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both	   contingent	   and	   diverse	   and,	   as	   such,	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   seizing	   of	   the	   self	  
completely	   and	   definitively	   escapes	   the	   subject.	   Foucault	   finds	   the	   sign	   of	   this	  
dispossession	   and	   expropriation	   from	   which	   the	   complete	   grasping	   of	   man	   by	  
himself	   emerges	   in	   Bichat’s	   injunction	   “open	   up	   some	   corpses”.	   It	   is	   from	   this	  
injunction	  that	  the	  dissection	  will	  stitch	  together	  both	  the	  list	  of	  symptoms	  and	  the	  
anatomical	   observation	   and	   confirm,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   that	   “the	   first	   scientific	  
discourse	  [delivered	  by	  our	  culture]	  concerning	  the	   individual	  had	  to	  pass	  through	  
this	  stage	  of	  death”.23	  
	  
Thus,	   seeming	   to	   borrow	   the	   regressive	   path	   of	   phenomenology,	   in	   order	   to	  
abruptly	   change	   tack	   towards	   history,	   serves	   a	   precise	   purpose,	   beyond	   the	  
disagreement	   regarding	   the	   foundation	  of	   knowledge.	   This	  purpose	   could	  already	  
be	   called	   ethico-­‐political,	   even	   though	   this	   terminology	   only	   appears	   later-­‐on	   in	  
Foucault’s	  work.	  The	   issue	   is	   in	  effect	  for	  Foucault	  to	  consider	  the	  deep	  solidarity,	  
within	  modernity,	  that	  unites	  the	  objective	  gaze	  that	  puts	  the	  body	  in	  the	  role	  of	  a	  
thing	  offered	  to	  observation,	  with	   the	  discourse	   that	  asserts,	  on	   the	  contrary,	   the	  
dignity	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   one’s	   own	   body	   and	   its	   irreducibility	   to	   all	   external	  
comprehension.	  Is	  it	  really	  possible	  to	  oppose	  to	  the	  body-­‐machine	  and	  the	  science	  
which	   takes	   hold	   of	   it,	   the	   eminence	   and	   authenticity	   of	   the	   lived	   body,	   on	   the	  
pretext	  that	  the	  latter	  would	  be	  both	  the	  foundation	  and	  the	  limit	  of	  all	  knowledge	  
of	  the	  body?	  Reading	  between	  the	  lines,	  this	  question	  is	  inevitably	  posed	  in	  a	  book	  
upon	  the	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic,	  upon	  the	  reasons	  which	   incite	  science	  to	  stand	  at	  the	  
patient’s	   bedside.	   And	   yet,	   the	   indications	  made	   by	   Foucault	   do	   not	   allow	  much	  
room	   for	   doubt	   concerning	   his	   position.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   fiction	   of	   an	  
immediate	   and	   sensible	   relation	   between	   the	   doctor	   and	   his	   patient	   and	   the	  
invocation	  of	  their	  mutual	  understanding	  is	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  appearance	  of	  
modern	  medicine	  as	  science	  of	  the	  individual:	  
Our	  contemporaries	   see	   in	   this	  accession	   to	   the	   individual	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	   ‘unique	  
dialogue’,	  the	  most	  concentrated	  formulation	  of	  an	  old	  medical	  humanism,	  as	  old	  as	  man’s	  
compassion	   […]	   the	   feebly	  eroticized	  vocabulary	  of	   ‘encounter’	  and	  of	   the	   ‘doctor/patient	  
                                                
23ET 243 op.cit., pp.200-201. 
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relationship’	   exhausts	   itself	   in	   trying	   to	   communicate	   the	   pale	   powers	   of	   matrimonial	  
fantasies	  to	  so	  much	  non-­‐thought	  Clinical	  experience.24	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  Foucault	  is	  so	  virulent,	  it	  is	  because	  such	  approaches	  obscure	  
what	   (according	   to	   him)	   is	   the	   real	   historical	   event	   which	   accounts	   for	   the	  
appearance	  of	  modern	  medicine:	  	  
This	  new	  structure	  is	   indicated	  –	  but	  not,	  of	  course,	  exhausted	  –	  by	  the	  minute	  but	  decisive	  
change,	  whereby	   the	   question:	   ‘What	   is	   the	  matter	  with	   you?’,	   with	  which	   the	   eighteenth	  
century	   dialogue	   between	   the	   doctor	   and	   patient	   began	   (a	   dialogue	   possessing	   its	   own	  
grammar	  and	  style),	  was	  replaced	  by	  that	  other	  question:	  ‘Where	  does	  it	  hurt?’,	  in	  which	  we	  
recognize	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  clinic	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  its	  entire	  discourse.25	  	  
	  
We	   touch	   here	   upon	   the	   link	   that	   unites,	   since	   the	   works	   of	   the	   “archeological”	  
period,	  the	  “historical	  and	  critical”26	  dimensions	  of	  Foucault’s	  reflection.	  Neither	  the	  
attempt	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  opposition	  between	  positivism	  and	  phenomenology,	  nor	  
the	   effort	   to	   let	   their	   common	   historical	   surface	   appear,	   are	   strangers	   to	   this	  
enigma:	   in	   modernity,	   the	   renewed	   access	   of	   man	   to	   himself,	   articulated	   in	   the	  
objective	   discourse	   of	   science	   or	   in	   the	   reflexive	   forms	   of	   an	   analysis	   of	   lived	  
experience,	   is	  united	   in	  a	  dispossession	   in	  which	  the	  body	   is	  only	  speaking	   for	   the	  
other	   or	   through	   the	   other,	   under	   the	   scrutinising	   gaze	   or	   attentive	   ear,	   in	   a	  
structure	   where,	   in	   any	   case,	   the	   interpretation	   of	   signs	   duplicates	   itself	   in	   the	  
establishment	  of	  an	  asymmetrical	  relation	  which	  Foucault	  will	   later	  call	  the	  power	  
relation.	  If	  access	  to	  the	  individual,	  an	  event	  	  which	  both	  begins	  and	  ends	  The	  Birth	  
of	  the	  Clinic,	  cannot	  be	  understood	  through	  the	  sole	  exploration	  of	  one’s	  own	  body;	  
it	   is	   also	   because	   the	   latter	   is	   unable	   to	   realise	   the	   solidarity	   between	   the	  
understanding	  of	  oneself	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  little	  question:	  “where	  does	  it	  hurt?”,	  a	  
question	   which	   entirely	   reorganises	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   doctor	   and	   his	  
                                                
24 ET xvi  “Cet accès à l’individu, nos contemporains y voient l’instauration d’un “colloque singulier” 
et la formulation la plus serrée d’un vieil humanisme médical, aussi vieux que la pitié des hommes. 
(...) le vocabulaire faiblement érotisé de la ‘rencontre’ et du ‘couple médecin-malade’ s’exténue à 
vouloir communiquer à tant de non-pensée les pâles pouvoirs d’une rêverie matrimoniale”, op. cit., 
pp.X-XI. 
25 ET xxi “Cette nouvelle structure est signalée, mais n’est pas épuisée bien sûr, par le changement 
infime et décisif qui a substitué à la question : ‘Qu’avez-vous?’, par quoi s’inaugurait au XVIIIe siècle 
le dialogue du médecin et du malade avec sa grammaire et son style propres, cette autre où nous 
reconnaissons le jeu de la clinique et le principe de tout son discours : ‘Où avez-vous mal?’”, op.cit. p. 
XIV. 
26 ET xxi, op.cit., p. XV. 
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patient	   and	   empowers	   the	   former	   over	   the	   latter.	   If	  The	  History	   of	  Madness	  was	  
meant	  to	  be	  “the	  archeology	  of	  silence”27,	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic	  leaves	  discreet	  but	  
decisive	  room	  for	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  patient.	  
	  
The	  body:	  genealogy	  of	  the	  individual	  body	  
If	  we	   spent	   a	   long	   time	   considering	  The	  Birth	   of	   the	   Clinic,	   it	   is	   because	   it	   seems	  
possible	  to	  recognise	  some	  germinal	  elements	  in	  it,	  even	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  
proliferation	   of	   bodies	  which	  will	  mark	   Foucault’s	  works	   in	   the	   following	   decade.	  
Where	   then,	   to	   locate	   the	   break,	   if	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   references	   to	   the	   body	   do	  
introduce	   a	   transformation,	   between	   the	   “archeology”	   of	   the	   1960s	   and	   the	  
“genealogy”	  practiced	  in	  Discipline	  and	  Punish	  and	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge?	  In	  fact,	  
we	  must	  make	  a	  distinction	  here:	  if	  from	  1964	  the	  body	  is	  an	  object	  and	  an	  issue	  for	  
critique,	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1970s	   it	   becomes	   a	   tool,	   an	   operator,	   of	   the	  
approach	  itself,	  Foucault	  relying	  	  henceforth	  on	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  body	  to	  clarify	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  his	  critical	  categories	  could	  be	  ambiguous	  and	  unsatisfactory.	  
	  
Foucault	  	  explains	  this	  new	  usage	  in	  a	  lecture	  given	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1973,	  whose	  
posthumous	  publication	  throws	  a	  vital	  light	  over	  the	  whole	  period.28	  Explaining	  why	  
he	   plans	   to	   return	   in	   that	   year	   to	   psychiatry,	   which	   he	   studied	   fifteen	   years	  
previously	   in	   The	   History	   of	  Madness,	   he	   blames	   himself	   for	   too	   often	   using	   the	  
notion	   of	   “violence”	   	   at	   that	   time	   in	   order	   to	   qualify	   Esquirol’s	   or	   Pinel’s	   use	   of	  
physical	  force	  during	  their	  asylum	  treatments.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  critical	  tone	  of	  
the	  book	  implicitly	  relies	  on	  an	  unquestioned	  opposition	  between	  a	  “violent”	  power	  
and	   another	   power	  which	   is	   not	   violent.	   Such	   a	   supposition	  would	   introduce,	   he	  
adds	  in	  1973,	  two	  defects.	  Firstly,	  it	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  assume	  the	  existence	  and	  
legitimacy	   of	   a	   power	  which,	   because	   it	   is	   not	   physical,	  would	   therefore	   be	   non-­‐
violent.	   Secondly,	   it	   tends	   to	   identify	   all	   physical	   expression	   of	   power	   with	   the	  
unpredictable	   exercise	   of	   an	   irregular	   force,	   making	   imperceptible	   the	   part	   of	  
                                                
27 “Préface” (first preface to Folie et déraison. Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique), Dits et Ecrits, 
T.I, p.160. 
28 Michel Foucault, “Leçon du 7 novembre 1973”, in Le pouvoir psychiatrique, cours au Collège de 
France 1973-74, Paris, Gallimard-Le Seuil (coll. “Hautes Etudes”), 2003. pp.8 sq. 
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rationality	  involved	  in	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  the	  plurality	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  can	  be	  
organised.	   To	   these	   two	   defects,	   Foucault	   endeavors	   to	   make	   two	   corrections,	  
perceptible	  through	  two	  theses	  announced	  in	  this	  lecture	  course:	  
	  
...what	  is	  essential	  in	  all	  power	  is	  that	  ultimately	  its	  point	  of	  application	  is	  always	  the	  body.	  
All	   power	   is	   physical,	   and	   there	   is	   a	   direct	   connection	   between	   the	   body	   and	   political	  
power.29	  	  
	  
...power	  is	  physical	  (...)	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  unbridled,	  but	  in	  the	  sense,	  rather,	  that	  it	  
is	  commanded	  by	  all	  the	  dispositions	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  microphysics	  of	  bodies30	  
	  
The	  reader	  of	  Discipline	  and	  Punish	  will	  recognise	  in	  these	  two	  precepts,	  announced	  
in	  a	  tone	  of	  regret,	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  “microphysics	  of	  power”	  employed	  in	  the	  
study	  of	  discipline.	  From	  now	  on,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  body	  will	  play	  a	  
double	   role.	   Firstly,	   it	   will	   look	   to	   demystify	   all	   approaches	   to	   social	   phenomena	  
limited	  solely	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	  discourse	  of	   legitimation	  which	  supports	  
them	  or	   to	   the	   legal	   forms	  which	   organise	   them:	   to	   remind	   us	   that	   “all	   power	   is	  
physical”,	   is	  especially	  to	  forbid	  the	  understanding	  and	  evaluation	  of	  modernity	   in	  
accordance	  with	   the	  humanism	   to	  which	   it	   lays	   claim,	   insofar	  as	   it	   claims	   to	  have	  
substituted	  	  for	  bodily	  constraint	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  relations	  controlled	  and	  authorised	  
by	  law.	  Secondly,	  the	  minute	  attention	  applied	  to	  the	  body	  will	  have	  to	  show	  that,	  
on	  a	  physical	  level,	  the	  historical	  difference	  regarding	  the	  exercise	  of	  authority	  does	  
not	   involve	  a	  move	   from	  brutal	  violence	   to	  disembodied	  obligations,	  but	   is	   rather	  
between	   various	   modes	   of	   organisation	   of	   power,	   each	   of	   them	   constituting	   a	  
“rational,	   calculated,	   and	   controlled	   game”31.	   The	   aim	   is	   therefore	   to	   contest	   all	  
legal-­‐political	  idealism	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  body	  and	  to	  shed	  light	  
on	   the	   various	   forms	   of	   rationality,	   if	   not	   “idealism”,32	   immanent	   to	   them.	   The	  
whole	  economy	  of	  Discipline	  and	  Punish	  is	  situated	  between	  these	  two	  gestures	  for	  
                                                
29 ET 14, “...ce qu’il y a d’essentiel dans tout pouvoir, c’est que son point d’application, c’est toujours, 
en dernière instance, le corps. Tout pouvoir est physique, et il y a entre le corps et le pouvoir politique 
un branchement direct”, op.cit., p.15. 
30 ET 14, “...le pouvoir est physique (...) non pas au sens où il est déchaîné, mais au sens, au contraire, 
où il obéit à toutes les dispositions d’une espèce de microphysique des corps”, op.cit., p.16. 
31ET 14 ibid. 
32 On “ideality” of disciplinary rationality, see the Foucault’s remarks in “La Table ronde du 20 mai 
1978”, Dits et écrits, T.IV, p.28. The double status, material and ideal of what Foucault calls 
“discipline” obviously pose particular problems. On this subject, see P. Artières et M. Potte-
Bonneville, D’après Foucault, Paris, Les Prairies ordinaires, 2007, ch.IV. 
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the	   sake	   of	   one	   and	   the	   same	   objective:	   to	   shake	   the	   acknowledged	   opposition	  
between	   the	  penalty	  of	   an	   ancient	   regime	   	   founded	  on	   violence	   and	   the	  modern	  
prison,	  an	  institution	  in	  which	  obedience	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  state	  would	  suffice	  
to	  guarantee	  humanity.	  	  
	  
To	   this	  alternative,	  Foucault	   responds	   thus:	  1)	  The	  establishment	  of	   legal	  equality	  
amongst	  citizens,	  the	  codification	  of	  procedures	  or	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  scale	  of	  
punishments	  do	  not	  prevent	  the	  necessity	  for	  power	  to	  have	  a	  hold	  over	  the	  body.	  
Furthermore,	  they	  require	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  their	  exercise	  a	  preliminary	  ordering	  of	  
society	   through	   mechanisms	   which	   allow	   the	   application	   of	   legal	   forms	   but	  
continuously	   bias	   the	   effect.33	   2)	   This	   critique	   which	   reveals	   the	   body	   beneath	  
reason,	  does	  not,	  however,	  work	  without	  another	  movement	  which	  discloses	  and	  
differentiates	   the	   modes	   of	   rationalisation	   of	   the	   body:	   in	   the	   section	   called	  
“torture”,	   Foucault	   shows	   that	   the	   apparent	   barbarity	   of	   the	   punishments	   of	   the	  
ancient	  regime	  complies	  with	  a	  precise	  economy	  which	  regulates	  its	  procedure	  and	  
links	  its	  protocol	  to	  the	  intrinsic	  logic	  of	  royal	  power:	  “’penal	  torture’	  does	  not	  cover	  
any	   corporal	   punishment	   :	   it	   is	   a	   differentiated	   production	   of	   pain,	   an	   organised	  
ritual	  for	  the	  marking	  of	  victims	  and	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  power	  that	  punishes”34.	  It	  
is	   not	   that	   Foucault	   is	   looking	   to	   bring	   back	   instruments	   of	   torture	   such	   as	  
quartering,	  the	  wheel	  or	  pliers.	  It	  rather	  concerns	  taking	  apart	  the	  discourse	  which,	  
by	  returning	  ancient	  forms	  of	  punishment	  to	  an	  ageless	  barbarity,	  claims	  in	  contrast	  
to	   exonerate	   modern	   penality	   by	   locating	   it	   on	   the	   side	   of	   an	   immaterial	  
intervention,	  only	  concerned	  with	  the	  “soul”	  of	  the	  condemned.	  He	  aims	  overall	  to	  
show	  that	  a	  precise	  rationality	  was	  already	  involved	  in	  the	  most	  brutal	  punishment	  
inflicted	  on	  the	  body.	  The	  body	  	  still	  contributes	  to	  a	  regime	  which	  would	  claim	  to	  
be	  the	  pure	  incarnation	  of	  reason.	  The	  issue	  is	  therefore	  not	  to	  confuse	  everything	  
                                                
33 On this double relation of opposition and complementarity, see notably the relation between 
juridical law and disciplinary forces of opposition, Surveiller et Punir, p.224 sq. 
34 ET 34 “le supplice pénal ne recouvre pas n’importe qu’elle punition corporelle : c’est une 
production differentiée de souffrances, un rituel organisé pour le marquage des victimes et la 
manifestation du pouvoir qui punit”., Surveiller et Punir, p.39. 
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but	   to	   apprehend,	   in	   its	   uniqueness,	   the	  political	   technologies	   through	  which	   the	  
body	  is	  kept	  in	  order.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  renewed	  programme,	  directed	  towards	  challenging	  the	  fact	  
that	  modern	  politics	  transcends	  the	  level	  of	  physical	  relations	  between	  individuals,	  
and	  also	  that	  this	  relation	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  uncontrolled	  exercise	  of	  brutal	  force	  
that	   the	  questions	  already	  presented	   in	  The	  Birth	  of	   the	  Clinic	   return.	  Let	  us	  once	  
more	   consider	   the	   three	   affirmations	   put	   forward	   by	   Foucault:	   1)	   an	   intimate	  
solidarity	  links	  the	  body	  as	  object	  offered	  to	  an	  objective	  knowledge	  and	  “my	  body”	  
as	   lived	   experience,	   calling	   for	   a	   reflexive	   elucidation:	   beyond	   their	   apparent	  
opposition,	  both	  	  emerge	  from	  the	  same	  matrix.	  	  2)	  Therefore,	  a	  parte	  subjecti,	  the	  
relation	  that	  each	  person	  experiences	  with	  his	  or	  her	  own	  body	  is	  intertwined	  with	  
an	  exteriority	  where	  the	  threat	  of	  dispossession	  is	  posed	  from	  the	  question	  “where	  
does	  it	  hurt?”	  which	  turns	  speech	  into	  a	  symptom,	  right	  up	  to	  Bichat’s	  dissections.	  
3)	   Critiquing	   this	  modern	   arrangement	   of	   the	   body	  must	   involve	   a	   history	   of	   the	  
individual	   and	   not	   a	   fundamental	   experience	   in	   which	   the	   self-­‐affecting	   subject	  
reconquers	   its	   integrity.	   This	   history	   would	   establish	   how	   the	   individual	   far	   from	  
being	   an	   infrangible	   given,	   is	   the	   result	   of	   the	   exterior	   intersection	   of	   historical	  
determinations	  and	  political	  operations.	  These	  are	  the	  three	  claims	  which	  are	  going	  
to	  be	   fully	  developed	   through	   the	  genealogy	  of	  power,	  elaborated	   in	  particular	   in	  
Discipline	  and	  Punish	  and	  in	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge.	  Being	  unable	  to	  recall	  here	  all	  
the	  remarks	  that	  Foucault	  devotes	  to	  the	  body,	  we	  will	  limit	  ourselves	  to	  indicating	  
what	  regulates	  its	  economy.	  
	  
1)	  A	  false	  alternative.	  The	  particular	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  works	  seem	  to	  form	  a	  
diptych	  is	  instructive.	  It	  seems	  at	  first	  glance	  that	  they	  are	  differentiated	  from	  each	  
other	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  body	  which	  they	  put	  forward:	  in	  1975,	  Discipline	  and	  
Punish	   deals	   essentially	   with	   the	   observed	   body,	   that	   is,	   exposed	   to	   a	   scientific	  
characterisation	   and	   a	   technical	   reorganisation	   that	   maximises	   its	   utility	   and	  
obedience:	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The	  historical	  moment	  of	  the	  disciplines	  was	  the	  moment	  when	  an	  art	  of	  the	  human	  body	  was	  
born,	  which	  was	  directed	  not	  only	  at	  the	  growth	  of	   its	  skills,	  nor	  at	  the	   intensification	  of	   its	  
subjection,	   but	   at	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   relation	   that	   in	   the	  mechanism	   itself	   makes	   it	   more	  
obedient	  as	  it	  becomes	  more	  useful,	  and	  conversely.35	  
	  
In	  1976,	  in	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge,	  it	  is	  the	  speaking	  and	  spoken	  body	  that	  is	  put	  into	  
question,	   a	   body	   of	   which	   each	   manifestation	   demands	   not	   an	   exterior	   and	  
objective	   description,	   but	   a	   deciphering	   of	   which	   the	   subject	   itself	   is	   both	   the	  
source	  and	  the	  rule,	   the	  text	  and	   its	   reader,	  a	  proximity	  of	  which	  the	   fable	  of	   the	  
speaking	   sex	   invented	   by	   Diderot	   in	   Les	   Bijoux	   indiscrets	   would	   become	   the	  
emblem:	  
For	  many	  years,	  we	  have	  all	  been	  living	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  Prince	  Mangogul:	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  an	  
immense	  curiosity	  about	  sex,	  bent	  on	  questioning	  it,	  with	  an	  insatiable	  desire	  to	  hear	  it	  speak	  
and	  be	  spoken	  about,	  quick	  to	  invent	  all	  sorts	  of	  magical	  rings	  that	  might	  force	  it	  to	  abandon	  
its	  discretion.36	  
	  
It	  is	  thus	  striking	  to	  see	  Foucault,	  in	  the	  space	  of	  one	  year,	  thematising	  the	  presence	  
of	  the	  body	  in	  modernity	  under	  two	  figures	  not	  only	  different,	  but	  seeming,	  firstly,	  
to	   exclude	   one	   another.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   disciplinary	   operations	   are	  
characterised	  by	  the	  eviction	  of	  significant	  elements	  of	  behaviour	  solely	  for	  the	  sake	  
of	  the	  account	  of	  its	  determination	  and	  physical	  effects:	  “constraint	  bears	  upon	  […]	  
forces	   rather	   than	   upon	   […]	   signs;	   the	   only	   truly	   important	   ceremony	   is	   that	   of	  
exercise”37.	  Foucault	  devotes	  considerable	  attention	   to	   this	  discarding	  of	  meaning	  
in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  body,	  showing	  how,	   in	  the	  chapter	  “The	  Gentle	  Way	  in	  
Punishment”,	   silent	   imprisonment	  has	  by	   the	  end	  of	   the	  18th	   century	  overcome	  a	  
“semi-­‐technical”	   penality	   founded	   on	   ceremony	   and	   representation38.	   As	   for	   the	  
enquiry	   into	  sexuality,	  this	   leads	  to	  completely	  opposite	  results:	   	  “We	  have	  placed	  
ourselves	   under	   the	   sign	   of	   sex,	   but	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   Logic	   of	   Sex	   rather	   than	   a	  
                                                
35 ET 137-8 “Le moment historique des disciplines, c’est le moment où naît un art du corps humain, 
qui ne vise pas seulement la croissance de ses habiletés, ni non plus l’alourdissement de sa sujétion, 
mais la formation d’un rapport qui dans le même mécanisme le rend d’autant plus obéissant qu’il est 
plus utile, et inversement”., Surveiller et Punir, p.139. 
36 ET 77 “Nous vivons tous depuis bien des années, au royaume du prince Mangobul : en proie à une 
immense curiosité pour le sexe, obstinés à le questionner, insatiables à l’entendre et à en entendre 
parler, prompts à inventer tous les anneaux magiques qui pourraient forcer sa discrétion”., La Volonté 
de Savoir, p.101. 
37 ET 137 “la contrainte porte sur les forces plutôt que sur les signes ; la seule cérémonie qui importe 
vraiment, c’est celle de l’exercice”, Surveiller et Punir, p.139. 
38 Surveiller et punir, particularly pp.116-134.  
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Physics”39.	   A	  multiplication,	   this	   time,	   of	   signs	   and	   of	  meaning.	   And	   yet,	   these	   a	  
priori	   incompatible	   forms	   of	   attention	   to	   the	   body	   are	   eventually	   reintegrated	  
within	   one	   and	   the	   same	   history,	   as	   the	   last	   chapter	   of	   The	   Will	   to	   Knowledge	  
converts	  them	  into	  two	  major	  poles	  of	  power	  over	  life,	  poles	  “linked	  together	  by	  a	  
whole	   intermediary	  cluster	  of	  relations”	  which	  Foucault	  calls	  “an	  anatomic-­‐politics	  
of	  the	  human	  body”	  and	  “a	  bio-­‐politics	  of	  the	  population”40.	  No	  preeminence,	  then,,	  
of	   the	   intimacy	   with	   his	   own	   body	   experienced	   by	   modern	   man	   and	   of	   the	  
interpretation	   that	   prolongs	   it	   over	   the	   operations	   which	   deny	   corporeality	   all	  
significant	  value,	  claiming	  to	  explain	   it	  objectively	  and	  to	  modify	   it	   technically.	  On	  
the	   contrary,	   from	   a	  methodological	   point	   of	   view,	   it	   is	   surely	   essential	   that	   the	  
enquiry	   undertaken	   in	  Discipline	   and	   Punish	   precedes	   the	   analyses	   in	  The	  Will	   to	  
Knowledge:	   the	   anti-­‐hermeneutic	   principle	   that	   governs	   the	   first	   book	   (“beneath	  
every	  set	  of	  figures,	  we	  must	  seek	  	  not	  for	  a	  meaning,	  but	  a	  precaution”41)	  allows,	  in	  
the	  second	  book,	  this	  sidestep	  which,	  rather	  than	  accepting	  the	  body	  as	  an	  object	  
for	   interpretation,	   takes	   this	   very	   interpretation	   as	   an	   object	   of	   history.	   In	   other	  
words,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   have	   measured	   how	   modernity	   could	   meticulously	  
eradicate	   the	   slightest	   element	   of	   meaning	   from	   the	   relation	   that	   each	   person	  
experiences	   with	   their	   own	   body,	   in	   order	   to	   reveal	   in	   all	   of	   its	   strangeness	   the	  
surfeit	  of	  meaning	  that	  individuals	  give	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  their	  sex.	  It	  is	  necessary	  
to	  have	  taken	  the	  measure	  of	  this	  “anatomy	  of	  detail”	  constituted	  by	  the	  disciplines	  
in	   order	   to	   shed	   another	   light	   on	   this	   discourse	   where	   the	   subject,	   in	   the	   first	  
person,	  seeks	  its	  own	  identity	  in	  the	  wanderings	  of	  its	  desires.	  Not	  as	  the	  revelation	  
of	  a	  deep	  truth	  wrongly	  hidden	  by	  the	  objectifications	  of	  the	  body,	  but	  as	  the	  effect	  
of	  a	  primordial	  “incorporation”,	  and	  as	  the	  anonymous	  exteriority	  of	  practices	  and	  
social	  institutions.42	  
	  
                                                
39 ET 78  “Nous nous sommes placés nous-mêmes sous le signe du sexe, mais d’une Logique du sexe, 
plutôt que d’une Physique”, La Volonté de Savoir, p.102, underlined by Foucault. 
40 ET 139, La Volonté de savoir, pp. 182-183. 
41 ET 139 “sous les moindres figures, chercher non pas un sens, mais une précaution”, Surveiller et 
Punir, p.141. 
42 On “the incorporation” of perversions, see La Volonté de savoir, pp.58-60. 
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2)	  Objectification	  and	  reflexivity.	  The	  historical	  contemporaneity	  of	  the	  body-­‐object	  
and	  of	  the	  signifying	  body	  also	  implies	  a	  game	  of	  reciprocal	  borrowings	  between	  the	  
processes	   that	   give	   birth	   to	   each	   of	   these	   figures.	   In	   other	  words,	   as	   opposed	   as	  
they	  may	   seem,	  one	  would	  not	  dissociate	  entirely	   the	   techniques	  which	   institute,	  
from	   the	   outside,	   the	   body	   as	   object	   of	   knowledge	   and	   those	   which,	   contrarily,	  
compel	  the	  subject	  to	  acknowledge	  itself	  and	  provide	  explanations	  for	  itself	  through	  
discourse.	  According	   to	  H.	  Dreyfus	   and	  P.	  Rabinow,43	  Discipline	  and	  Punish	  would	  
demonstrate	   the	  grounding	  of	   the	   “objectifying	   social	   sciences”	   in	   the	  practice	  of	  
the	  examination44	  and	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge	  would	  demonstrate	  the	  grounding	  of	  
the	  “subjectifying	  social	  sciences”	  in	  the	  ritual	  of	  confession.45	  But	  such	  a	  distinction	  
only	   carries	   a	   relative	   value	   because	   the	   aim	  of	   these	   two	  books	   is	   to	   show	  how	  
each	  of	   these	  processes	   essentially	   embraces	   a	  moment	   borrowed	   from	  another:	  
there	  is	  no	  disciplined	  body	  without	  a	  “subjection”	  which	  exceeds	  its	  strict	  physical	  
determinations.	   Similarly,	   there	   is	   no	   body	   that	   is	   sexualised	   without	   the	  
constitution	  of	  an	  objective	  knowledge	  of,	  and	  a	  subordination	  to,	  the	  other	  which	  
exceeds	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  strict	  relation	  to	  oneself.	  
	  
This	   intertwining	   is	   thematised,	   in	   Discipline	   and	   Punish,	   through	   the	   famous	  
metaphor	  of	  the	  soul,	  allowing	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  Platonic	  soma	  sema.	  
The	  man	  described	  for	  us,	  whom	  we	  are	   invited	  to	  free,	   is	  already	   in	  himself	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  
subjection	   much	   more	   profound	   than	   himself.	   A	   ‘soul’	   inhabits	   him	   and	   brings	   him	   to	  
existence,	  which	  is	  itself	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  mastery	  that	  power	  exercises	  over	  the	  body.	  The	  soul	  
is	  the	  effect	  and	  instrument	  of	  a	  political	  anatomy;	  the	  soul	  is	  the	  prison	  of	  the	  body.46	  
	  
The	  modern	  transformation	  of	  penal	  practice	  with	  which	  the	  book	  starts	  is	  targeted	  
here.	   It	   is	   a	   transformation	  which	   sees	  modern	   judgment	   shift	   from	   the	   criminal	  
character	   of	   facts	   towards	   the	   personality	   of	   the	   accused	   and	   the	   biographical	  
origins	   of	   his	   gesture	   through	   “a	   whole	   set	   of	   assessing,	   diagnostic,	   prognostic,	  
                                                
43 H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault, un parcours philosophique, chap. VII-VIII. 
44 On examination, see Surveiller et Punir, pp.186-196. 
45 On confession, see La Volonté de savoir, pp.78-84. 
46 ET 30, “L’homme dont on nous parle et qu’on invite à libérer est déjà en lui-même l’effet d’un 
assujettissement bien plus profond que lui. Une ‘âme’ l’habite et le porte à l’existence, qui est elle-
même une pièce dans la maîtrise que le pouvoir exerce sur le corps. L’âme, prison du corps.”, 
Surveiller et Punir, p.34. 
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normative	   judgments	   concerning	   the	   criminal”47.	   And	   yet,	   Foucault	   is	   so	   far	   from	  
considering	  this	  shift	  merely	  illusory,	  as	  if	  this	  dual	  quest	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  	  crime	  
and	  punishment	  were	  only	  hiding	  the	  strictly	  corporeal	  efficiency	  of	  discipline,	  that	  
he	  will	   return	  to	  “microphysics”	   in	  order	  to	  unveil	   it:	   the	  soul	   involved	  here	   is	  not	  
only	   a	   mirage	   but	   a	   “part”,	   which	   means	   that	   the	   concrete	   reference	   to	   the	  
personality	   of	   the	   criminal	   is	   an	   indispensible	   element	   in	   the	   coordinated	  
functioning	  of	  the	  diverse	  instances	  henceforth	  involved	  “in	  the	  framework	  of	  penal	  
judgment”48.	   In	   short,	   the	   exteriority	   of	   knowledge	   and	   intervention	   secured	   by	  
discipline	  on	  the	  body	  of	  the	  individual	  calls	  for	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  interiority	  of	  a	  
“who?”	   likely	   to	   confirm	   in	   the	   first	  person	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   inflicted	   treatments,	  
just	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  modest	   residents	   of	   the	   penitentiary	   colony	   in	  Mettray	  
whose	  voices	  end	  Discipline	  and	  Punish:	  
	  
...the	   inmates	   […]	   in	   singing	   the	   praises	   of	   the	   new	   punitive	   policies	   of	   the	   body	   [would	  
remark]:	  “We	  preferred	  the	  blows,	  but	  the	  cell	  suits	  us	  better”.49	  
	  
As	   for	   The	   Will	   to	   Knowledge,	   this	   movement	   is	   reversed	   since	   the	   book	   is	  
concerned	  with	   revealing	   the	   “objectifying	  moment”	   hidden	  within	   the	   device	   of	  
sexuality,	   even	   though	   the	   latter	   is	   firstly	   defined	   as	   a	   permanent	   incitement	   to	  
reflexivity	  as	  the	  social	  production	  of	  a	  hermeneutic	  relation	  of	  every	  individual	  to	  
himself.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Foucault	  clarifies	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  individuals	  go	  and	  
seek	  their	  truth	  through	  their	  own	  sex	  is	  historically	  	  accompanied	  by	  an	  apparently	  
more	   theoretical	   and	   exterior	   discourse,	   where	   medieval	   pastoral	   care	   strongly	  
maintained	  links	  to	  the	  interrogation	  of	  the	  flesh	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  penitence:	  
the	  secure	  bond	  that	  held	  together	  the	  moral	  theology	  of	  concupiscence	  and	  the	  obligation	  of	  
confession	   (equivalent	   to	   the	   theoretical	   discourse	   on	   sex	   and	   its	   first-­‐person	   formulation)	  
was,	   if	   not	   broken,	   at	   least	   loosened	   and	   diversified:	   between	   the	   objectification	   of	   sex	   in	  
rational	   discourses,	   and	   the	   movement	   by	   which	   each	   individual	   was	   set	   to	   the	   task	   of	  
recounting	  his	  own	  sex,	   there	  has	  occurred,	  since	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  
tensions.50	  
                                                
47 ET 19, op.cit., p.24. 
48 ET 19, ibid. 
49 ET 293, “...les colons disaient couramment, pour chanter les louanges de la nouvelle politique 
punitive des corps : ‘Nous préférerions les coups, mais la cellule nous vaut mieux’, op.cit., p.300. 
50 ET 33-34, “le lien solide qui attachait l’une à l’autre la théorie morale de la concupiscence et 
l’obligation de l’aveu (le discours théorique sur le sexe et sa formulation en première personne), ce 
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However,	   if	  this	  disjunction	  is	  possible,	   it	   is	  because	  the	  logic	  of	  confession,	  which	  
according	   to	   Foucault	   originates	   from	   the	   twofold	   contemporary	   search	   for	   the	  
truth	   of	   sex	   and	   the	   truth	   of	   the	   self	   through	   sex,	   is	   itself	   traversed	   by	   a	  
fundamental	  ambivalence.	  It	  is	  “a	  ritual	  of	  discourse	  in	  which	  the	  speaking	  subject	  is	  
also	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   statement”,	   but	   that	   notwithstanding,	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  
statement	   provoke	   “intrinsic	   modifications”	   in	   the	   speaker.	   It	   is,	   therefore,	   in	   a	  
sense	  a	  pure	  game	  played	  by	  oneself	  with	  oneself.	  However,	  the	  confession	  is	  not	  
conceivable	   without	   “the	   presence	   (or	   virtual	   presence)	   of	   a	   partner	   who	   is	   not	  
simply	   the	   interlocutor	  but	   the	  authority	   	  who	  requires	   the	  confession,	  prescribes	  
and	   appreciates	   it,	   and	   intervenes	   in	   order	   to	   judge,	   punish,	   forgive,	   console	   and	  
reconcile”51.	  We	  once	  more	  discover	  here	  a	  general	  aspect	  of	  Foucault’s	  thought:	  a	  
suspicion	   of	   the	   same	   kind	   which	   led	   him	   in	   the	   History	   of	   Madness	   to	   revised	  
downward	   the	  value	  of	   self-­‐consciousness	  promised	  by	  asylum	  treatments	  and	   to	  
read	  it	  instead	  as	  the	  “humiliation	  of	  being	  an	  object	  for	  oneself”52.	  As	  far	  as	  we	  are	  
concerned,	  we	  will	  note	  that	  the	  reflexive	  relation	  of	  every	  individual	  towards	  his	  or	  
her	   own	   body,	   as	   described	   in	   The	  Will	   to	   Knowledge	   in	   the	   nodal	   reference	   to	  
sexuality,	   is	   essentially	   compromised	   by	   the	   form	   of	   an	   objective	   knowledge	   in	  
which	   Foucault	   does	   not	   see	   a	   vector	   of	   emancipation	   but	   an	   anchoring	   point	   of	  
power	  relations	  at	  the	  very	  core	  of	  oneself.	  In	  short:	  my	  body	  is	  not	  disciplined	  like	  
an	  object:	  sooner	  or	  later	  it	  requires	  my	  own	  narration;	  similarly	  I	  cannot	  admit	  who	  
I	  am	  to	  myself	  without	  making	  use	  of	  the	  distance	  required	  by	  both	  knowledge	  and	  
the	  gaze,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  my	  lived	  body.	  
	  
3)	  A	  history	  of	  the	  individual.	  How	  does	  one	  characterise	  the	  body	  thus	  constituted	  
at	   the	   crossroads	   between	   disciplinary	   normalisation	   and	   the	   hermeneutics	   of	  
                                                                                                                                     
lien a été sinon rompu, du moins détendu et diversifié: entre l’objectivation du sexe dans des discours 
rationnels et le mouvement par lequel chacun est mis à la tâche de raconter son propre sexe, il s’est 
produit depuis le XVIIIe siècle une série de tensions...”, La Volonté de Savoir, pp.46-47. 
51 ET 61-62, “la présence au moins virtuelle d’un partenaire qui n’est pas simplement l’interlocuteur, 
mais l’instance qui requiert l’aveu, l’impose, l’apprécie et intervient pour juger, punir, pardonner, 
consoler, reconcilier”, op.cit., p.83. 
52 Histoire de la folie, p.519. 
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desire?	   It	   is	  perhaps	  here	   that	   the	  concept	  of	   the	   individual	  would	  best	  designate	  
the	  vanishing	  point	  of	  the	  various	  enquiries	  that	  Foucault	  undertook.	  The	  idea	  may	  
seem	   paradoxical:	   is	   not	   the	   individual,	   on	   the	   contrary	   (and	   according	   to	  
etymology),	  that	   indivisible	  entity	  grasped	  by	  discourse	  and	  power	  as	  the	  material	  
upon	  which	  they	  operate,	  and	  which	  they	  tend	  to	  conceal	  under	  various	  historical	  
figures?	  We	  touch	  here	  on	  the	  heart	  of	  suspicion	  of	  the	   initially	  evoked	  circularity	  
which	   for	   Foucault	   seems	   sometimes	   to	   make	   the	   individual	   the	   support,	   and	  
sometimes	  the	  product,	  of	  discursive	  and	  social	  processes.	  However,	  the	  ambiguity	  
comes	   undone	   as	   soon	   as	   we	   detect	   that	   Foucault	   distinguishes	   several	   times	  
between	   bodies	   and	   individuals’	   bodies,	   making	   of	   the	   latter	   a	   historical	   and	  
political	   transformation	   of	   the	   former.	   It	   is	   thus,	   for	   example,	   that	   we	   must	  
understand	  this	  passage	   from	  The	  Will	   to	  Knowledge,	  which	  describes	  how	  power	  
works:	  
It	   did	   not	   set	   boundaries	   for	   sexuality;	   it	   extended	   the	   various	   forms	  of	   sexuality,	   pursuing	  
them	  according	  to	  lines	  of	  indefinite	  penetration.	  It	  did	  not	  exclude	  sexuality,	  but	  included	  it	  
in	  the	  body	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  specification	  of	  individuals.53	  
	  
Such	   a	   statement	   is	   unintelligible	   if	   we	   do	   not	   grasp	   that	   the	   “specification”,	   far	  
from	   being	   applied	   to	   bodies	   whose	   individuality	   would	   be	   entirely	   fixed	  
beforehand,	   instead	   contributes	   to	   their	   determination	   by	   calling	   on	   everyone	   to	  
recognise	  and	  distinguish	   themselves	   through	   the	  objects,	  practices,	  etc	  on	  which	  
they	  fix	  their	  desires.	  The	  individual	  body	  is	  thus	  described	  by	  genealogy,	  not	  as	  pre-­‐
political	   unit	   of	   analysis	   but	   as	   the	   superimposition	   of	   a	   series	   of	   processes	   of	  
individualisation,	  whose	  solidarity	  and	  variety	  Foucault	  underlines.	  
	  
It	   is	   thus	   that	  Discipline	  and	  Punish	   can	  define	   the	  modern	   individual	  body	  as	   the	  
synthesis	   of	   four	   characteristics	   working	   alongside	   four	   disciplinary	   techniques	  
whose	  logic	  is	  different	  and	  complementary:	  
To	  sum	  up,	  it	  might	  	  be	  said	  that	  discipline	  creates	  out	  of	  the	  bodies	  it	  controls	  four	  types	  of	  
individuality,	  or	  rather	  an	  individuality	  that	  is	  endowed	  with	  four	  characteristics:	  it	  is	  cellular	  
                                                
53 ET 47, “Il ne fixe pas les frontières de la sexualité ; il en prolonge les formes diverses, en les 
poursuivant selon des lignes de pénétration indéfinie. Il ne l’exclut pas, il l’inclut dans le corps 
comme mode de spécification des individus”., La Volonté de Savoir, p.64, underlined by us. 
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(by	  the	  play	  of	  spatial	  distribution),	   it	   is	  organic	  (by	  the	  coding	  of	  activities),	   it	   is	  genetic	  (by	  
the	  accumulation	  of	  time),	  it	  is	  combinatory	  (by	  the	  composition	  of	  forces).54	  
	  
We	  can	  see	  that	  if	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic	  considers	  how	  modernity	  could	  have	  lifted	  
“the	   old	   Aristotelian	   prohibition”,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   “one	   could	   at	   last	   hold	   a	  
scientifically	   structured	  discourse	  about	   the	   individual”55,	   	   the	  answer	  provided	   in	  
Discipline	  and	  Punish	   consists,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   in	   linking	  this	  structure	  not	   to	  an	  
internal	  evolution	  of	  the	  history	  of	  biology,	  but	  to	  its	  social	  matrix,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	   in	   showing	   that	   certain	   epistemological	   alternatives	   concerning	   the	   very	  
status	  of	  individuality	  (such	  as	  the	  rivalry	  between	  the	  models	  of	  the	  machine	  and	  
the	  organism	  to	  which	  Georges	  Canguilhem56	  devoted	  his	  attention,	  a	  fact	  which	  is	  
not	  ignored	  by	  Foucault)	  can	  find	  a	  common	  foundation	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  various	  
techniques	  of	  keeping	  the	  body	  in	  order.	  The	  human	  individual	  is	  not	  indebted	  to	  a	  
mechanical,	   organic	   or	   dynamic	   understanding	   without	   firstly	   being	   shaped	   by	  
being	   distributed	   in	   tables	   and	   classifications	   as	   well	   as	   by	   its	   enlistment	   in	  
operations	   and	   by	   the	   virtues	   of	   exercise.57	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   already	   complex	  
portrait,	  The	  Will	   to	   Knowledge	   contributes	   the	   correlation	   between	   at	   least	   two	  
modes	   of	   individualisation:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   what	   should	   be	   called	   a	   subjective	  
identification,	  taking	  the	  form	  of	  a	  personal	  discourse	  about	  oneself;	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  an	  objective	  differentiation,	  opposing	  diverse	  types	  of	  bodies	  by	  attributing	  a	  
threat	   and	   a	   mode	   of	   precise	   normalisation	   to	   them.	   On	   one	   side,	   the	   body	  
individualises	   itself	  as	   in	  the	  source	   in	  which	  everyone	  seeks	  their	   identity,	   	  whilst	  
trying	  to	  discern	  its	  own	  identity	  according	  to	  a	  dual	  quest	  for	  the	  “true	  sex”,	  a	  task	  
which	  Foucault	  will	  later	  summarise	  as	  follows:	  	  
                                                
54 ET 167 “En résumé, on peut dire que la discipline fabrique à partir des corps qu’elle contrôle quatre 
types d’individualité, ou plutôt une individualité qui est dotée de quatre caractères : elle est cellulaire 
(par le jeu de la répartition spatiale), elle est organique (par le codage des activités), elle est génétique 
(par le cumul du temps), elle est combinatoire (par la composition des forces)”., Surveiller et Punir, 
p.169. 
55 ET xv, Naissance de la clinique, p. X. 
56 G. Canguilhem, “Machine et organisme”, in La Connaissance de la vie, Paris, Vrin, 1952. 
57 On these various techniques constituting discipline, see Surveiller et Punir, chap. “les corps 
dociles”. 
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At	  the	  crossroads	  of	  these	  two	  ideas	  -­‐	  we	  must	  not	  be	  mistaken	  concerning	  our	  own	  sex	  and	  
the	  fact	  that	  our	  sex	  conceals	  what	  is	  truest	  within	  us	  -­‐	  psychoanalysis	  has	  rooted	  its	  cultural	  
strength	  therein.58	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   side,	   bodies	   are	   differentiated	   according	   to	   the	   type	   of	   social	  
intervention	  which	  they	  call	   for	  and	   justify	  by	  becoming	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  particular	  
concern:	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge	  thus	  indicates,	  as	  the	  direction	  for	  future	  research	  
(research	   that	   Foucault	   will	   however	   set	   aside),	   the	   necessity	   to	   describe	   the	  
process	  of	  the	  “hysterisation	  of	  women’s	  bodies”,	  the	  “pedagogisation	  of	  children’s	  
sex”,	   the	   “socialisation	   of	   procreative	   behaviour”,	   and	   the	   “psychiatrisation	   of	  
perverse	  pleasure”,59	  as	  so	  many	  forms	  within	  which	  modern	  bodies	  are	  forced	  to	  
be	  distributed	  and	  through	  which	  they	  acquire	  their	  individual	  definition.	  
	  
There	   is	   therefore	   (and	   this	   should	   be	   enough	   to	   prevent	   any	   “liberal”	  
interpretation	   of	   Foucault	   as	   a	   defender	   of	   the	   sovereign-­‐individual)	   an	   essential	  
disparity	   in	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   individuality	   of	  men	   is	   formulated	   through	   the	  
insertion	  of	   the	  body	   in	   social	   relations	  of	   a	   certain	   type.	   There	   follows	   from	   this	  	  
one	  consequence	  and	  one	  problem.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that	  this	  individuality	  of	  the	  
body	  cannot	  be	  given	  the	  support	  of	  rights	  opposed	  to	  all	  political	  intervention,	  for	  
this	   individuality	   cannot	   be	   considered	   as	   an	   entity	   anterior	   or	   exterior	   to	   the	  
intervention	   itself.	   Nor	   can	   the	   latter	   be	   exerted	   without	   conflict	   or	   resistance,	  
without	   something	   resisting	   its	   development,	   but	   we	   cannot	   play	   with	   the	  
categories	   of	   the	   individual,	   in	   order	   to	   qualify	   this	   “something”,	   without	  
remembering	   that	   these	  categories	  are	  behind	   the	   type	  of	  normalisation	   that	   this	  
point	   of	   resistance	   holds	   in	   check.	   This	   is	   what	   Foucault	   clearly	   indicates	   in	   his	  
lecture	  The	  Abnormals,	  concerning	  the	  figure	  of	  “the	  individual	  to	  be	  corrected”:	  a	  
figure	  born	  in	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  those	  who	  escape	  the	  
“new	   procedures	   of	   training	   of	   the	   body,	   of	   behaviour,	   and	   of	   aptitude”;	   but	   a	  
figure	  whose	  characterisation	  as	  an	  individual	  has	  the	  aim	  of	  reinserting	  him	  within	  
                                                
58 ET 104-5“Au point de croisement de cs deux idées - qu’il ne faut pas nous tromper en ce qui 
concerne notre sexe, et que notre sexe recèle ce qu’il y a de plus vrai en vous - la psychanalyse a 
enraciné sa vigueur culturelle”. 
59 La Volonté de Savoir, pp.137-139. 
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the	   social	   game,	   “in	   this	   game	   (...)	   between	   the	   family	   and	   then	   the	   school,	   the	  
workshop,	   the	   street,	   the	   district,	   the	   parish,	   the	   church,	   the	   police,	   etc.”.60	   The	  
goal	   will	   not	   then	   be,	   from	   a	   critical	   and	   practical	   standpoint,	   to	   withdraw	   the	  
individual	  body	  from	  the	  hold	  of	  power,	  classically	  defined	  as	  State	  Sovereignty,	  but	  
“to	  free	  us	  from	  the	  State	  and	  from	  the	  type	  of	  individualisation	  which	  is	  linked	  to	  
it”.61	  The	  problem	  is	  then:	  what	  consistency	  can	  we	  give	  to	  this	  “us”,	  if	  it	  must	  at	  the	  
same	   time	  be	  distinguished	   from	  a	   collection	  or	   an	   association	  of	   individuals	   and	  
also	   remain	  anchored	   in	   the	   reference	   to	   the	  body	  which	   regulates,	   from	  start	   to	  
finish,	  the	  genealogical	  critique?	  
	  
The	  Body:	  Towards	  an	  Ethics	  of	  Heterogeneity	  
In	   order	   to	   find	   an	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   introduce	   a	   third	  
register	  of	  reference	  to	  the	  body,	  whose	  recurrence	  within	  Foucault’s	  work	  follows	  
another	  rhythm	  and	  another	  periodisation	  than	  that	  which	  we	  have	  already	  come	  
across.	  Neither	  a	  question	  exerting	   its	   influence	  from	  a	  work	  which	  takes	   it	   for	  an	  
explicit	  object	  (as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  relation	  between	  one’s	  own	  body	  and	  the	  living	  
body	  in	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic),	  nor	  a	  method	  serving	  to	  singling	  out	  a	  precise	  period	  
in	   the	   work	   (as	   is	   the	   case	   with	   “the	   microphysics	   of	   power”	   of	   1973),	   but	   an	  
ancient	  and	  an	  erratic	  counterpoint,	  springing-­‐up	  whilst	  reading	  the	  texts,	  without	  
much	  explanation	  or	   justification.	   This	   is	   indicated	  by	   a	   sibylline	  declaration	   from	  
the	  inaugural	  lecture	  of	  1970	  at	  the	  Collège	  de	  France:	  
The	   result	   is	   that	   the	  narrow	  gap	  which	   is	   to	  be	   set	   to	  work	   in	   the	  history	  of	   ideas	   […]	   this	  
narrow	   gap	   looks,	   I’m	   afraid,	   like	   a	   small	   (and	   perhaps	   odious)	   piece	   of	   machinery	   which	  
would	  enable	  us	  to	   introduce	  chance,	  the	  discontinuous,	  and	  materiality	  at	  the	  very	  root	  of	  
thought.62	  
	  
This	  materialist	   claim	   could	   be	   surprising	  within	   a	   text	   essentially	   devoted	   to	   the	  
elucidation	   of	   the	   category	   of	   discourse	   (to	   the	   point	   which	   Foucault	   feels	  
                                                
60 “dans ce jeu (...) entre la famille et puis l’école, l’atelier, la rue, le quartier, la paroisse, l’église, la 
police, etc.”, Michel Foucault, Les Anormaux - cours au Collège de France 1974-1975, Paris, 
Gallimard-Le Seuil (coll. “Hautes Etudes”), 1999, pp.53-54, 308-309. 
61 “Le sujet et le pouvoir”, Dits et écrits, T.IV, p.232. 
62 ET 69, “Le mince décalage qu’on se propose de mettre en oeuvre dans l’histoire des idées (...) je 
crains bien d’y reconnaître quelque chose comme une petite (et odieuse peut-être) machinerie qui 
permet d’introduire à la racine même de la pensée le hasard, le discontinu et la matérialité”., Michel 
Foucault, L’Ordre du discours, Paris, Gallimard, 1971, p.61, underlined by Foucault. 
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compelled,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  his	  approach,	  to	  call	   it	  a	  curious	  “materialism	  of	  the	  
incorporeal”63).	  	  However,	  this	  claim	  teaches	  us	  a	  lesson	  that	  is	  two-­‐fold	  .	  Firstly,	  it	  
indicates	  that	  the	  concern	  with	  materiality	  precedes	  the	  moment	  in	  the	  work	  when	  
Foucault	  refers	  to	  the	  destiny	  of	  the	  body	  so	  as	  to	  demystify	  the	  legal	  and	  idealist	  
approach	  to	  society.	  At	   the	  very	  beginning	  of	   its	  critical	   function,	  beyond	  the	  sole	  
enquiry	  into	  human	  individuality,	  the	  model	  of	  material	  bodies	  tries	  very	  early	  on	  to	  
colour	  the	  kind	  of	  regard	  Foucault	  gives	  to	  his	  historical	  objects,	  regardless	  of	  their	  
discursive	   nature.	   Secondly,	   this	   “odious	  machinery”	   does	   not	   aim	   at	   providing	   a	  
“real	   basis”	   to	  history	   such	   as,	   for	   example,	   a	   determined,	   stable	   and	   solid	   cause	  
comparable	  to	  matter	  itself.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  materiality	  is	  merely	  convoked	  here	  to	  
be	  immediately	  associated	  with	  “chance”	  and	  “discontinuity”	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  matter	  
of	   thus	  dispersing	   the	   foundation	  of	   things,	   of	   frustrating	   every	   search	   and	  every	  
promise	   of	   sense	   and	   unification,	   a	   little	   like	   the	  way	   in	  which,	   for	   Epicurus	   and	  
Lucretius,	   the	   forms	   offered	   to	   the	   experience	   and	   imagination	   of	   men	   turn	   out	  
eventually	   to	   be	   nothing	   more	   than	   momentary	   combinations	   of	   atoms	   without	  
profound	  significance	  and	  born	  from	  the	  necessary	  laws	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  
forever	   inexplicable	  event	  of	  the	  clinamen.	  The	  pregnancy	  of	  such	  a	  “corpuscular”	  
model	   occasionally	   shows	   itself	   at	   the	   very	   surface	   of	   the	   texts,	   in	   order	   to	  
characterize	   the	   final	   term	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   power:	   “I	   have	   gone	   in	   search”,	  
Foucault	  writes,	  “of	  these	  sorts	  of	  particles	  endowed	  with	  an	  energy	  all	  the	  greater	  
for	  their	  being	  small	  and	  difficult	  to	  discern”.64	  
	  
To	   follow	   this	   track	   would	   once	   more	   detect	   in	   Foucault	   the	   presence,	   in	   the	  
background	  of	  the	  analysis,	  of	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  body	  which	  	  could	  be	  said,	  without	  
paradox,	  to	  be	  essentially	  plural.	  Regularly,	  Foucault	  inserts	  at	  the	  very	  place	  where	  
philosophers	  normally	   locate	  the	  founding	  and	  unitary	  authority	  of	  an	  essence,	  an	  
irreducible	  multiplicity	  from	  which	  individualised	  figures	  emerge	  (but	  which	  for	  this	  
very	  reason	  they	  are	  also	  varying	  and	  precarious).	  This	  affirmation,	  as	  we	  have	  just	  
                                                
63 ET 69, op.cit., p.60. 
64 ET 161, “J’étais parti, écrit Foucault, à la recherche de ces sortes de particules dotées d’une énergie 
d’autant plus grandes qu’elles sont elles-mêmes plus petites et difficiles à discerner”, M. Foucault, 
“La vie des hommes infâmes, Dits et écrits, T.III, p.240. 
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seen,	  precedes	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  genealogical	  paradigm	  and	  its	  attention	  to	  the	  
physical	  dimension	  of	  power:	  we	  find	  traces	  of	  it	  as	  early	  as	  the	  History	  of	  Madness,	  
where	  what	   Foucault	   calls	   ‘unreason’	   sometimes	   takes	  on	   the	   features	  of	   a	   force	  
which,	  as	  in	  Goya,	  challenges	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  body	  and	  the	  face.65	  But	  above	  all	   it	  
will	  provide	  the	  support	  lacking	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  individualisation,	  
developed	  by	  Foucault	   in	  the	  1970s,	  by	   locating	  “the	  bodies”	   in	  their	   innumerable	  
plurality	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  political	  history	  of	  the	  body	  and	  of	  the	  individual	  forms	  it	  
successively	  adopts.	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  read	  in	  Discipline	  and	  Punish:	  
[disciplinary	  power]	  “trains”	  the	  mobile,	  confused,	  useless	  multitudes	  of	  the	  body	  and	  forces	  
them	   into	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   individual	   elements	   -­‐	   small	   separate	   cells,	   organic	   autonomies,	  
identities	  and	  genetic	  continuities,	  combinatorial	  segments.66	  
	  
However,	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  reference,	  do	  we	  go	  beyond	  the	  “fortunate	  positivism”67	  
which	  Foucault	  calls	  for,	  towards	  a	  metaphysics	  praising,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  real,	  a	  
power	   of	   metamorphosis	   of	   which	   the	   human	   body	   would	   only	   be	   one	  	  
manifestation	   amongst	   others?	   In	   the	   comparison	   he	   makes	   of	   Foucauldian	   and	  
Marxist	   materialisms,	   Etienne	   Balibar	   points	   to	   this	   suspicion,	   noting	   that	   “the	  
question	   cannot	   fail	   to	   be	   addressed	   of	   what	   in	   Foucault’s	   materialism	   and	  
historicism	   lead	   to	   the	   immediate	   proximity	   of	   vitalism,	   not	   to	   say	   biologism,”.68	  
One	  could	  add	  that	  the	  reinterpretation	  by	  Toni	  Negri	  of	  Foucauldian	  bio-­‐politics	  in	  
the	  sense	  of	   its	   integration	  within	  a	  philosophy	  of	   life	  as	  the	  multitude’s	  power	  of	  
self-­‐affirmation	   has	   subsequently	   provided	   a	   frank	   answer	   to	   this	   question.69	  We	  
will	   not	   discuss	   here	   the	   political	   fecundity	   of	   this	   reading;	   it	   seems	   to	   us	   that	   it	  
does	  not	  correspond	  to	  Foucault’s	   intention	  when	  he	   talks	  of	  “the	  body”.	  For	  our	  
purposes,	   this	  reference	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  opening	  the	  historical	  enquiry	  to	  a	  more	  
fundamental	   horizon,	   which	   would	   both	   establish	   its	   ontological	   basis	   and	   its	  
                                                
65 Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, reed. Paris, Gallimard (coll. “Tel”), 1972, pp.550-551. 
66 “(le pouvoir disciplinaire) ‘dresse’ les multitudes mobiles, confuses, inutiles de corps et de forces en 
une multiplicité d’éléments individuels - petites cellules séparées, autonomies organiques, identités et 
continuités génétiques, segments combinatoires”., Surveiller et Punir, p.172, underlined by us. 
67 L’Ordre du discours, p.72. 
68 “La question ne peut pas ne pas être posée de ce qui, dans le matérialisme et l’historicisme de 
Foucault, amène au voisinage immédiat du vitalisme, pour ne pas dire du biologisme”, E. Balibar, 
“L’enjeu du nominalisme”, in workshop., Michel Foucault philosophe - Rencontres internationale 
Paris 9, 10, 11 janvier 1988, Paris, Seuil (coll. “Des travaux”), 1989, p.74. 
69 T. Negri, Empire, ed. Paris, Exil, 2000. For a critique of this reading, see notably J. Rancière, 
“Biopolitique ou politique”, Multitudes, n°1, mars 2000, pp.88-93. 
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teleological	   orientation.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   its	   preliminary	   function	   forbids	   any	  
determination,	   in	   the	   final	   analysis,	   of	   what	   is	   actually	   transformed	   and	  
individualised	  through	  the	  game	  of	  power	  relations,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  any	  designation	  of	  
a	  common	  measure	  which	  the	  different	  historical	  configurations	  could	  result	  in.	  To	  
be	  more	  precise,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  this	  mention	  of	  “the	  body”	  plays	  two	  distinct	  
roles:	  it	  has	  to	  make	  any	  historical	  definition	  of	  the	  body	  appear	  as	  singular	  and	  also	  
bring	  to	  light	  its	  problematic	  dimension.	  
	  
1)	   Singularisation.	   As	   we	   have	   said,	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   Foucault’s	   genealogical	  
approach	  is	  to	  bring	   into	  question	  the	  progressive	  vision	  of	  political	  modernity,	  by	  
relating	   the	   history	   of	   its	   legal	   and	   institutional	   forms	   to	   the	   succession	   of	   the	  
various	  techniques	  involved	  in	  ensuring	  the	  mastery	  of	  the	  body.	  This	  attempt	  could	  
however	   be	   subjected	   to	   an	   objection:	   would	   it	   not	   	   be	   possible,	   on	   this	   new	  
terrain,	   to	   both	   retrace	   a	   continuity	   of	   history	   by	   establishing	   filiations	   between	  
various	  techniques	  and	  reestablish	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  teleological	  reading	  by	  noting	  
how	   the	  modes	   of	  management	   of	   bodies	   have	   gained	  more	   and	  more	   precision	  
and	   efficiency,	   etc.?	   If,	   for	   instance,	   the	   very	   peculiar	   political	   rationality	   which	  
Foucault	  calls	  “governmentality”	  is	  born,	  as	  he	  claims,	  from	  a	  reflection	  undertaken	  
in	   the	   18th	   century	   regarding	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   costs	   of	   power70	   could	   be	  
reduced,	  can	  we	  not	  at	  least	  argue	  that	  there	  has	  been	  an	  economical	  improvement	  
on	  this	  plan?	  After	  all,	  the	  notion	  of	  progress	  would	  certainly	  find	  clearer	  criteria	  in	  
the	  technical	  domain	  than	  in	  the	  political	  or	  moral	  domain	  and	  there	  could	  indeed	  
be	  a	  contradiction	  between	  Foucault’s	   refusal	  of	   the	   teleology	  and	  materialism	  of	  
his	  approach.	  
	  
It	  is	  on	  this	  point	  that	  the	  account	  of	  “the	  body”	  and	  of	  the	  unpredictable	  exteriority	  
of	   events	   that	   traverses	   it	   	   finds	   a	   strategic	   function.	   The	  way	   in	  which	   Foucault	  
several	  times	  calls	  for	  the	  history	  of	  the	  diverse	  epidemics	  of	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  
of	   the	   Classical	   Age	   is	   characteristic:	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   deserted	   space	   of	  
                                                
70 M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique - cours au Collège de France 1978-79, Paris, Gallimard-
Le Seuil (coll. “Hautes études”), pp.29-53. 
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medieval	   leprosariums,	   soon	   reoccupied	   by	   the	   insane,	   opens	   the	   History	   of	  
Madness71;	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  ancient	  model	  and	  the	  surveillance	  measures	  
invented	   in	   the	  17th	   century	   in	  order	   to	   control	   the	  plague	   throws	   light	  upon	   the	  
disciplinary	  mechanisms	   in	  Discipline	  and	  Punish72.	   This	  duality	  between	  exclusion	  
and	  discipline	  is	  itself	  later	  put	  into	  play	  when	  Foucault	  opposes	  to	  the	  plague	  and	  
leprosy,	  smallpox	  as	  the	  crucible	  of	  statistical	  rationality	  and	  entirely	  new	  practices,	  
predating	  new	  forms	  of	  governmentality.73	  	  Hence,	  at	  each	  moment,	  the	  conceptual	  
distinctions	   made	   in	   order	   to	   account	   for	   the	   practice	   of	   power	   are	   reinvested	  
within	  this	  history	  of	  disease.	  Consequently,	  the	  evolution	  of	  political	  techniques	  is	  
thus	  exposed	  to	  the	  exterior	  intervention	  of	  events	  whose	  irruption	  challenges	  any	  
attempt	  to	  produce	  a	  linear	  history.	  To	  turn	  the	  plague	  into	  the	  trigger	  for	  a	  series	  
of	  innovations	  regarding	  the	  control	  of	  the	  body	  and	  then	  to	  turn	  these	  innovations	  
into	  a	  paradigm	  which,	  two	  centuries	  later,	  major	  social	  institutions	  will	  generalise	  
so	  that	  they	  become	  the	  normal	  circumstances	  of	  collective	  life,	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  
implication	   within	   the	   history	   of	   disciplines,	   of	   what	   the	  Order	   of	   Discourse	   calls	  
chance,	  continuity	  and	  materiality.	  It	  is	  does	  not	  slip	  a	  metaphysical	  base	  under	  the	  
random	   parameters	   of	   history,	   but	   forbids,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   regressive	  
movement	  which	  would	  lead	  from	  the	  continuity	  of	  history	  to	  the	  exhibition	  of	   its	  
foundations	  and	   its	  permanent	  objectives.	   In	  other	  words,	   Foucault	  makes	  use	  of	  
what	   he	   calls	   “the	   body”	   as	   an	   operator	   aiming	   to	   multiply	   the	   cause	   of	   each	  
historical	   fact,	   and	   making	   singularity	   emerge,	   an	   operation	   which	   he	   calls	  
“eventalising”.74	  
	  
2)	  Problematisation.	  We	  would,	  however,	  reduce	  the	  scope	  of	  Foucault	  to	  limit	  his	  
concern	  with	   the	  body	   to	   the	  effects	  he	   induces	   in	   the	  objective	   consideration	  of	  
history.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   events	   emerge	   from	   the	   “heterogeneous”	   in	   the	   literal	  
                                                
71 Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, pp.13-16. 
72 Surveiller et Punir, pp.197-201. 
73 M. Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population - cours au Collège de France 1977-78, Paris, 
Gallimard-Le Seuil (coll. “Hautes études”), 2004 pp.11-13. 
74 On “the eventalization” as “causal multiplication”, see “Table ronde du 20 mai 1978”, Dits et écrits, 
T.IV, pp.23-25. 
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sense	  of	  the	  term	  (i.e.	  what	  emerges	  within	  difference	  and	  diversity75)	  is	  doubtlessly	  
what	   the	   genealogist	   needs	   to	   bear	   in	   mind	   if	   he	   wants	   to	   avoid,	   after	   the	  
dissolution	   of	   the	   idealities	   of	   “sex”	   or	   of	   “reason”,	   betraying	   his	   nominalism	   by	  
turning	  the	  body	  into	  a	  new	  absolute.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  without	  doubt	  the	  ethical	  point	  
of	  view	  which	  he	  forces	  himself	  to	  observe,	  as	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  preserved,	  defended	  
and	  affirmed	  against	  any	  claim	  to	  definitively	  determine	  the	  body.	  “The	  body	  and	  
pleasure”,	  which	  Foucault	  turns	  into	  “the	  basis	  for	  the	  counter-­‐attack”	  in	  The	  Will	  to	  
Knowledge	  (itself	  being	  the	  point	  from	  which	  we	  started)	  can	  certainly	  not	  play	  the	  
role	  of	  a	  principle,	   for	  their	  evocation	  remains	  deliberately	  undetermined.	   Instead	  
they	  are	  charged	  with	  reminding	  us	  of	   the	  precarious,	  contestable	  and	  potentially	  
violent	  nature	  of	  every	  true	  characterisation	  of	  the	  body	  by	  making	  us	  value	  what	  
exceeds	  and	  disturbs	  it.	  
	  
This	   critical	   role	   is	  particularly	  prevalent	   in	   the	  narrative	  which	  Foucault	  advances	  
concerning	  the	  case	  of	  Herculine	  Barbin,	  a	  hermaphrodite	  brought	  up	  in	  an	  almost	  
exclusively	   feminine	  environment	  before	  being	   forced	   to	   change	  her	   legal	   sex,	   an	  
event	   which	   would	   lead	   her	   to	   suicide.	   The	   whole	   analysis	   that	   he	   proposes	   of	  
Herculine’s	  written	  memoirs	  is	  traversed,	  in	  effect,	  by	  an	  opposition	  between	  sexual	  
difference,	   the	   guarantee	   of	   self-­‐identity	   to	  which	   Herculine	   is	   assigned,	   and	   the	  
experience	   of	   corporeal	   differences	   (as	   per	   the	   memoir	   she	   writes)	   which	   were	  
permitted	  	  life	  within	  a	  mono-­‐sexual	  community.	  
Most	  of	  the	  time,	  those	  who	  tell	  of	  their	  sex	  change	  belong	  to	  a	  strongly	  bisexual	  world.	  The	  
uneasiness	  of	  their	  identity	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  pass	  to	  the	  other	  side	  (...).	  Here,	  the	  
intense	   mono-­‐sexuality	   of	   religious	   and	   scholarly	   life	   serves	   as	   revelation	   of	   the	   tender	  
pleasures	  which	  reveal	  and	  provoke	  the	  sexual	  non-­‐identity	  when	  it	  gets	  lost	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  
all	  the	  similar	  bodies.76	  
	  
We	  see	  the	  role	  that	  the	  reference	  to	  monosexual	  communities	  plays	  here:	  not	  one	  
of	  a	  model	  to	  be	  defended	  but	  one	  of	  a	  “point	  of	  problematisation	  ”	  with	  respect	  to	  
                                                
75 “P. Loraux, “Le souci de l’hétérogène”, in workshop, Au risque de Foucault, Paris, ed. Centre 
Geroges Pompidou, 1997, pp.31-39. 
76 “La plupart du temps, ceux qui racontent leur changement de sexe appartiennent à un monde 
fortement bisexuel ; le malaise de leur identité se traduit par le désir de passer de l’autre côté (...). Ici, 
l’intense monosexualité de la vie religieuse et scolaire sert de révélateur aux tendres plaisirs que 
découvre et provoque la non-identité sexuelle, quand elle s’égare au milieu de tous ces corps 
semblables”., “Le vrai sexe”, Dits et Ecrits, T.IV, p.121. 
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the	  claim	  of	  turning	  sexual	  difference	  into	  the	  sole	  truth	  of	  the	  individual	  body	  and	  
its	   identity.	   It	   is	   significant,	   by	   the	   way,	   that	   Foucault	   finds	   the	   traces	   of	   this	  
experience	   	  not	  directly,	  but	   through	  a	   text	   reporting	  afterwards	  what	   it	   took	   for	  
someone	   to	   renounce	   it:	   far	   from	   staging	   it	   in	   a	   Rousseau-­‐esque	   way,	   bodies	  
frolicking	   freely	   about	   in	   order	   to	   	   denounce	   the	  way	   in	   which	   power	   oppresses	  
them	  and	  shuts	  them	  down,	  Foucault	  only	  detects	  the	  former	  through	  the	  latter	  like	  
its	   shadow	   or	   its	   scruple.	   Everything	   happens	   as	   if	   (to	   parody	   Kant)	   the	  medical,	  
legal	   and	   normative	   definition	   of	   the	   body	   was	   the	   “ratio	   cognoscendi”	   of	   a	  
multiplicity	   of	   bodies	   older	   than	   itself,	   a	   multiplicity	   thus	   forbidding	   the	  
consideration	  of	  the	  diverse	  versions	  of	  modern	  individuality	  as	  obvious,	  satisfying	  
and	  definitive.	   It	   is	   there	   for	   all	   to	   see	   that	   through	   this	   incitement	   to	  not	   forget	  
“the	  body”,	  there	  emerges	  an	  empty	  incarnation	  (overwhelming	  the	  definition	  of	  all	  
possible	  objectification)	  and	  an	  irresponsible	  dream	  (so	  ignorant	  of	  the	  suffering	  of	  
others	  that	  the	  body	  resists	  every	  identification,	  	  taking	  an	  ethical	  figure	  as	  a	  young	  
and	  desperate	  hermaphrodite).	  It	  seems,	  however,	  important	  to	  indicate	  here	  	  the	  
distance	   between	   the	   forms	   of	   social	   or	   discursive	   ordering	   of	   the	   body	   and	   the	  
disorder	  which	  resists	  them:	  as	  a	  reminder	  to	  not	  neglect	  what	  gravely	  envelops	  the	  
gesture	  of	  restoring	  plurality	  back	  to	  unity.	  	  
	  
